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Articles 
 
Fracking as a Test of the Demsetz Property Rights 
Thesis  
 
DAVID A. DANA† & HANNAH J. WISEMAN† 
Since its introduction in 1967, the account of property rights formation by Harold Demsetz has pervaded the legal 
and economic literature. Demsetz theorized that as a once-abundant, commonly shared resource becomes more 
valuable and sought-after, users will move to more clearly define property rights in the resource. Despite the high 
transaction costs of this approach, the costs of organizing and enforcing a rights regime become worthwhile in the 
face of scarcity. And privatization, in turn, leads to more efficient use of the resource by the individuals holding the 
property rights, with less externalization of the harmful effects of resource use. Modified accounts provide a more 
nuanced story in which “governance”—broadly speaking—emerges to address scarcity concerns. This governance 
can include traditional regulation that draws clearer property rights in the resource and forces cost internalization 
as well as innovative, less formal regimes, such as monitoring and reporting of resource use, voluntary agreements 
to internalize certain harms, and other commons management tools. But a conundrum remains: in some cases, 
scarcity does not generate regulation or innovative governance, and legal scholarship has called for more empirical 
testing of the reasons for this anti-Demsetzian response.  
Hydraulic fracturing, or “fracking,” presents a perfect case study for this sort of test. This oil and gas extraction 
technique, which has recently boomed in the United States, has identifiable and substantial negative externalities 
including, for example, air pollution and over-withdrawals of freshwater during droughts. Yet states and industry 
actors have not consistently responded with regulations or innovative governance strategies to internalize these 
externalities. In this Article, we explore the responses of three states experiencing a fracking boom and theorize the 
reasons for the diverse responses of these states to greater fracking externalities, including responses that do not track 
the Demsetz theory. We conclude that traditional political explanations, often pejoratively referred to as “capture” 
or “rent-seeking,” political culture, and legal institutions—particularly courts—account for the divergence between 
what we observe empirically and what Demestz’s theory would predict. 
 
 † Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law. 
 †  Attorneys’ Title Professor, Florida State University College of Law. This Article has benefited from 
the comments and suggestions by: Nestor Davidson, Lee Fennell, Tom Merrill, Eduardo Peñalver, Nadav 
Shoked, and Katrina Wyman. FSU Law Research Center librarians provided invaluable help with sources.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Harold Demsetz’s 1967 article on the origins of property rights is a classic 
in both economics and law.1 Yet, while Demsetz’s article has received and 
continues to receive significant academic attention, Demsetz’s theory has not 
been scrutinized extensively as an empirical matter.2 Demsetz told a simple story 
in his famous article. Consider, for example, cattle as a resource. As cattle 
become more valuable, there are greater returns on raising them, and thus more 
are raised. One possible externality of raising more cattle in an open-fields 
regime—grazing to the point of depletion—increases. Once the benefits of 
eliminating that depletion externality now exceed the costs of re-ordering the 
rights regime, the rights regime is reconfigured such that fields are now enclosed 
as private property. Legal exclusion will now temper or prevent depletion. 
As Henry Smith has noted, the Demsetz thesis never accounts for the 
historical facts that commons facing depletion threats sometimes were enclosed, 
but by the same token enclosed areas sometimes were transformed into 
semicommons.3 In a semicommons, some parts of the resource, such as partial 
strips of land in a field, remain as shared commons, and other parts are enclosed.4 
Moreover, threats of depletion sometimes result in semi-commons not being 
enclosed but being subject to more refined and protective resource rules 
applicable to all users—what Smith calls governance, as opposed to exclusion.5 
Smith agrees that changes in economics or technology that make a resource more 
valuable, and hence increase externalities, result in innovation. But he argues 
that, depending on the context, that innovation can look like new Blackstonian 
private property (exclusion), new collective regulation (governance), or 
something in between.6  
Following Smith, it is possible to reformulate the Demsetz thesis in a way 
that is less biased toward exclusion outcomes, more intuitive, and more likely to 
fit the realities of resource use and management. In particular, and again 
borrowing on Smith’s framework, we reformulate the Demsetz thesis as 
embodying two related propositions: 
 
 1. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 354–59 (1967). The 
Demsetz article features prominently in leading Property casebooks. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., 
PROPERTY, 32–34 (9th ed. 2018); THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES, 239–45 (3d ed. 2016).  
 2. Some case studies in other contexts have begun to provide empirical tests of the theory. See, e.g., Gary 
D. Libecap & James L. Smith, The Economic Evolution of Petroleum Property Rights in the United States, 31 
J. LEGAL. STUD. S589 (2002); Dean Lueck, The Extermination and Conservation of the American Bison, 31 
J. LEGAL STUD. S609 (2002).  
 3. Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 
131, 143 (2000) (observing that Demsetz’s example of property rights developing in the beaver fur industry as 
demand for fur increased is actually an example of a semicommons). 
 4. Id. at 148.  
 5. Henry E. Smith, Governing the Tele-Semicommons, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 289, 294 (2005); Henry E. 
Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1719, 1755–56 (2004). 
 6. Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. 
LEGAL STUD. S453, S474–84 (2002). 
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(1) Specification: With the spike in resource use, and hence externalities, 
there will be a different or greater specification of resource users’ rights and 
obligations. That specification often will take the form of a change in the 
legal regime (e.g., laws requiring or encouraging enclosure). It can also 
involve “softer” governance strategies, such as commons governance tools 
noted by Elinor Ostrom, including monitoring of user behavior, voluntary 
agreements among resource users or between communities and resource 
users, and similar mechanisms.7  
(2) Cost Internalization: The new or greater specification will encourage 
greater internalization of the social costs associated with the resource use. 
Ambiguities regarding rights and obligations that are tolerable when there 
is no great demand for a resource and minimal externalities associated with its 
use become intolerable in the face of high demand and potentially large 
externalities. In Demsetz’s example, when there is limited demand for cattle, 
there may be no need for a specification as to exactly where or for how long a 
particular group’s cattle may graze. But that is no longer true once new market 
opportunities create a widespread rush to raise as many cattle as possible. At that 
point, greater specification is needed, whether in the form of clearer boundaries 
and/or clearer use rules for the commons. This greater specification will foster 
cost internalization, thus addressing the problem that spurred the innovation in 
the first place. Thus, whether increased demand for cattle leads to clearer 
boundaries around private land or new use regulation for a semi-commons, we 
would anticipate that the innovation will operate so as to temper the risk of 
overgrazing.  
At a very minimum, when demand for a resource spikes, one might expect 
to see innovation in the form of better definition of: (a) the resource, and (b) the 
extent of resource use actually made of by each actor in the relevant 
geographical area. As Ostrom’s principles of design for resource management 
suggest, tracking and monitoring of resource use is a key feature of any 
management regime that does not rely on a pure-exclusion strategy for 
addressing externalities—a strategy that sometimes may be simply impossible, 
depending on the physical context.8  
As Tom Merrill has suggested, one approach to exploring what we call the 
reformulated Demsetz thesis would be to identify situations where, despite an 
increase in resource use and externalities, there has been no innovation in either 
exclusion or governance.9 One possible explanation for this lack of innovation 
could be that the total costs of innovation exceed the total benefits; in this 
scenario, as is entirely consistent with Demsetz’s classical economic approach, 
no innovation would be rational, efficient and unsurprising. But there are other 
reasons we might observe no innovation. Political power—often pejoratively 
 
 7. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE 
ACTION 90 (2018). 
 8. See id.  
 9. Thomas W. Merrill, Introduction: The Demsetz Thesis and the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 
J. LEGAL STUD. S331, S338 (2002).  
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referred to as capture or rent-seeking—might prevent innovations that would be 
“efficient” in a Demsetzian sense but would not be to the benefit of one of more 
politically powerful groups.10 Institutional economics, especially the Ostrom 
school of economics, which conceives of resource management as a deeply 
contextual matter, would suggest that there can be many reasons for the absence 
of innovation—politics, culture, and history (path dependence), among them.11 
Hydraulic fracturing, or “fracking,”12 provides an excellent context for 
exploring the reformulated Demsetzian thesis. Slick water fracking—the most 
common modern form of fracking, now applied to most wells—is a form of oil 
and gas extraction made possible by recent technological innovation.13 That 
innovation, in turn, made land rights and mineral rights much more valuable than 
had previously been the case, as oil and gas wells could be profitably established 
in areas and on sites where they never would have been located in the absence 
of the new technology.14 With greater extraction of the oil and gas resource, 
however, has come an increase in externalities—in costs that the fracking entity, 
like the cattle owner in an open-grazing field, does not itself necessarily bear, at 
least in the very near term. These three externalities we label as the water supply 
externality, the water quality externality, and the neighborhood amenity 
externality, which refers to localized impacts such as noise, aesthetic effects, and 
dust.15 Following the reformulated Demsetz thesis, one might suppose that, 
given the scale of the fracking “revolution” in energy production and its external 
effects and risks, that revolution would be accompanied by innovation. The 
innovation would more clearly specify fracking entities’ rights and obligations, 
and in a way that would address water supply, water quality, and neighborhood 
amenity concerns. 
We see such innovation in some of the jurisdictions with fracking, and thus 
we find some support for the Demsetz thesis, but we also see support for the 
conclusion that it may lack explanatory power in some contexts. Taken together, 
our three case studies—fracking in Pennsylvania, Colorado, and Texas—
 
 10. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Appraising the Progressive State, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1063, 1094 (2017) 
(“Writers about entitlements or regulation often speak of capture as ‘rent-seeking.’”); Michael A. Livermore & 
Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1340 (2013) 
(“Capture describes situations where organized interest groups successfully act to vindicate their goals through 
government policy at the expense of the public interest.”). 
 11. See OSTROM, supra note 7. 
 12. For a discussion of this terminology, see John M. Golden & Hannah J. Wiseman, The Fracking 
Revolution: Shale Gas as a Case Study in Innovation Policy, 64 EMORY L.J. 955, 957 n.1 (2015). 
 13. For detailed discussion of the multiple technological innovations that merged to allow widespread 
fracking in the United States by the late 2000s, see id. at 968–74. 
 14. See id. at 1000–01 (noting how George Mitchell—a fracking pioneer—invested in low-value land and 
mineral rights that later increased substantially in value due to fracking innovation).  
 15. Another way of formulating the effects of fracking is to conceive of it as raising tensions between the 
private, non-collective property right in oil and gas extraction, and the sometimes private—and sometimes 
collective—property rights in water supply, water quality, and the amenity of an urban or suburban neighborhood 
that is free from the aesthetic and psychological harms and perceived physical risks of encroaching oil and gas 
wells. See generally Lee Anne Fennell, Ostrom’s Law: Property Rights in the Commons, 5 INT’L J. COMMONS 
9 (2011) (describing collective neighborhood rights). 
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suggest that raw political power, cultural and legal traditions, and even the 
happenstance of the composition of a court can lead either to a Demsetzian 
outcome or one that strays from such an outcome. These various factors can 
facilitate a greater specification of rights and obligations in response to new 
technology and hence new resource demands and greater externalities, or they 
can effectively block any such specification. Context, above all, is what matters. 
Thus, even in its reformulated version, the Demsetz thesis, while providing an 
analytically appealing frame for analysis, does not necessarily tell us what will 
happen when there is increased demand for a limited resource.  
To further explore the Demsetz thesis through a fracking lens, this Article 
begins in Part I by documenting the externalities of fracking. To Demsetz, 
externalities were inseparable from property because property rights confer the 
right to “benefit or harm oneself or others,” such as selling a superior product to 
a competitor.16 An externality arises when the cost of internalizing the benefit or 
harm associated with the property right—in other words, causing one of the 
entities in the property relationship to bear the effects of the harm or benefit—
are too high to make voluntary internalization worthwhile.17 Changing the nature 
of the property right by placing more legal barriers on acquisition of the right, 
such as requiring a permit to frack a well, forces internalization.  
Part II explores responses to a boom in fracking activity in three states with 
divergent geographies and political cultures—Texas, Colorado, and 
Pennsylvania. This Part explores the extent to which greater negative 
externalities of oil and gas development generated a Demsetzian response, 
triggering enhanced exclusion in the form of greater specification of property 
rights or, alternatively or additionally, new governance. Part III then draws 
lessons from these case studies, exploring how they add to debates about the 
nature of property rights and the extent to which the Demsetz theory holds up 
when tested empirically. It demonstrates the emergence, in some cases, of 
Ostrom-type governance innovations as well as more traditional regulatory 
responses. And in other cases, the study shows a lack of innovation due to 
politics, institutional path dependence, and other factors.  
We conclude by emphasizing the need for further study of the variability 
of responses to similar resource demands, both in terms of the extent and 
substance of any innovation. The fracking case study matches the modern, more 
refined form of the Demsetz theory—a form enhanced by more nuanced legal 
and economic theories that augment the original account. But it also highlights, 
in some cases, the substantial deviation from the property rights innovation 
framework that dominates the current academic literature and the relatively 
sparse theory to explain this deviation.  
 
 16. Demsetz, supra note 1, at 347. 
 17. Id. at 347–48. 
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I.  FRACKING AND ITS EXTERNALITIES 
Slick water hydraulic fracturing for shale oil and gas, combined with 
horizontal drilling, represents a technological innovation that has transformed 
energy production in the United States (and elsewhere). In just a matter of years, 
U.S. annual oil production increased from more than 154 million barrels in 2005 
to more than 309 million barrels in 2017.18 During this same time period, annual 
domestic natural gas production rose from more than 1.5 trillion cubic feet to 
nearly 2.4 trillion cubic feet.19 The number of estimated fracked wells has 
skyrocketed, from 26,000 in 2000 to approximately 300,000 in 2015.20 
Moreover, there are active “plays” being fracked throughout the United States, 
and, where it is pursued, fracking is by no means limited to remote rural areas. 
Wells have been drilled very close to (and indeed in the midst of) exurban, 
suburban, and even urban population centers.21 In this respect, fracking has a 
geographic footprint unlike conventional oil and gas drilling or coal mining.22 
In several parts of the United States, it is possible to gaze out a school building 
window or the window of a single-family home in an urban or suburban 
development and see a fracked well.23  
 
 18. Petroleum & Other Liquids, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/ 
LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=MCRFPUS1&f=M (last updated Mar. 31, 2020). 
 19. Natural Gas, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9070us2m.htm (last 
updated Mar. 31, 2020). 
 20. Hydraulically Fractured Wells Provide Two-Thirds of U.S. Natural Gas Production, U.S. ENERGY 
INFO. ADMIN. (May 5, 2016), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=26112; Hydraulic Fracturing 
Accounts for About Half of Current U.S. Crude Oil Production, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Mar. 15, 2016), 
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=25372. 
 21. See City of Fort Worth Gas Well Status February 2018, https://fortworthtexas.gov/ 
developmentservices/gaswells/gas-well-map.pdf?v=2 (last visited Apr. 15, 2020) (showing 1980 producing 
natural gas wells within Fort Worth city limits). 
 22. Individually, fracked well sites are not always larger than conventional well sites. But fracking has 
enabled the drilling of thousands of wells that otherwise would not have been developed; with dwindling 
conventional supplies, oil and gas development in the United States would not have otherwise boomed. Further, 
multi-well sites with horizontally drilled wells are common for horizontally drilled and fracked wells. Horizontal 
drilling reduces the number of well sites needed, but multi-well sites mean that individual fracked well sites are 
larger. See NELS JOHNSON ET AL., PENNSYLVANIA ENERGY IMPACTS ASSESSMENT REPORT 1: MARCELLUS 
SHALE NATURAL GAS AND WIND 13 (2010), https://www.nature.org/media/pa/tnc_energy_analysis.pdf 
(describing multi-well pads); see also Michael Focazio, Geographic Footprint of Shale Gas Extraction, in 
HEALTH IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF SHALE GAS EXTRACTION: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 17, 25 (2014) (noting on-site 
and off-site land impacts, including, for example, sand mining for proppant used in fracking). But see Footprint 
Reduction, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2016/07/f33/ 
Footprint%20Reduction.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2020) (noting applied research that has helped to reduce 
unconventional well footprints).  
 23. See Sci. Advisory Bd. Hydraulic Fracturing Research Advisory Panel, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 
Summary Meeting Minutes 13, https://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/sabproduct.nsf/MeetingCal/ 
4EF0513AF548B70385257F17006EB070/$File/Minutes-HF+February+1+teleconference-Final.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2020) (providing a resident’s statement regarding a well 500 feet from the front door of his 
home); Julie Turkewitz, In Colorado, a Fracking Boom and a Population Explosion Collide, N.Y. TIMES (May 
31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/31/us/colorado-fracking-debates.html (noting a well that would 
soon be developed behind a school); Hannah J. Wiseman, Urban Energy, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1793, 1811 
(2016) (noting a man’s testimony about the impacts of a well in his backyard). 
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Because of the process of drilling, fracking, and waste disposal, the 
intensity with which it is being pursued, and its reach into highly populated 
areas, fracking generates substantial “externalities”—costs that, unless 
incentivized or required to do so, the companies that engage in and profit from 
fracking will not internalize. There have of course been substantial positive 
externalities from the boom,24 but on the negative side of the ledger, some of the 
externalities from fracking are realized as harm or costs by others. The noise 
from trucks servicing fracking wells, for example, is a harm to neighbors 
inasmuch as it affects their sense of tranquility and quality of life.25 Other 
externalities take the form of the imposition of risk of harm. For example, as 
discussed below, fracking creates a risk of water contamination, which in turn 
creates a risk of health and economic harms associated with contaminated 
drinking water.26 Even the most ardent foes of fracking would not claim that 
fracking in a given area is assured to contaminate groundwater and hence 
contaminate drinking water. Indeed, surface water contamination appears to 
have been far more common, and groundwater pollution incidents have been 
rare.27 But bearing the risk of contamination—even when the risk, although 
grounded in fact, is not reasonably quantifiable or subject to a wide range of 
plausible quantitative estimates—is an externality in itself.28  
Moreover, an externality, in its physical dimension, can be doubly 
impactful because it may include both aspects of immediately realized harm or 
costs and, at the same time, a risk of future harm or costs. Consider, for example, 
air pollution associated with the process of fracking wells. The air pollutants 
 
 24. See Thomas W. Merrill & David M. Schizer, The Shale Oil and Gas Revolution, Hydraulic Fracturing, 
and Water Contamination: A Regulatory Strategy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 145, 157 (2013) (noting large economic 
benefits). 
 25. See MD. DEPT. OF THE ENV’T, MARCELLUS SHALE RISK ASSESSMENT, app. F at 6 (2015), 
https://mde.state.md.us/programs/LAND/mining/marcellus/Documents/Appendix_F-
Noise_and_Visual_Risks.pdf.  
 26. The greater risk of contamination appears to be from spills of fracturing chemicals and flowback at the 
surface, which can seep through impermeable soil. There have also been rare instances of underground fracked 
wells themselves causing contamination. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING FOR OIL 
AND GAS: IMPACTS FROM THE HYDRAULIC FRACTURING WATER CYCLE ON DRINKING WATER RESOURCES IN 
THE UNITED STATES 6-1 (2016), https://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/hfstudy/recordisplay.cfm?deid=332990. 
 27. See id. at 6-1, 5-59 (noting that the EPA “identified two cases where hydraulic fracturing activities 
affected the quality of drinking water resources due to well construction issues, including inadequate cement or 
ruptured casing” and other cases in which methane migrated from wells with casing problems); see also id. at 5-
50 (noting other cases of surface water contamination and groundwater contamination from surface spills that 
likely seeped through soil intro groundwater sources). 
 28. Regarding quantitative estimates of the risk of groundwater pollution from drilling or fracking, one 
way to estimate the risk of contamination is to examine the frequency with which the casing (lining) of wells 
fails after drilling or fracking a well. One study estimates that unconventional (fracked) wells in Pennsylvania 
are 2.7 times more likely to fail than are conventional wells and that between 2000–2012, 6.2% of 
unconventional wells exhibited a loss of structural integrity of their casing. Anthony R. Ingraffea et al., 
Assessment and Risk Analysis of Casing and Cement Impairment in Oil and Gas Wells in Pennsylvania, 2000–
2012, 111 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIENCES 10955, 10956 (2014). Other studies that have used the same data set 
found lower failure rates. R.D. Vidic et al., Impact of Shale Gas Development on Regional Water Quality, 340 
SCI. 1235009-1, 1235009-4 fig.2 (2013) (estimating 3.4% leakage from unconventional wells).  
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may cause immediate harm, in the form of smog that reduces the aesthetic appeal 
of an area and results in respiratory irritation. But the air pollution also may 
impose the risk of greater harms of, for example, respiratory disease, which may 
not manifest until years after exposure.29 
Fracking produces many externalities, which vary depending on where and 
how fracking is undertaken, and these externalities can be described in a range 
of ways. We focus on three categories of externalities that we view as driving 
much of the current social and political controversy surrounding fracking—
water supply, water quality, and (what we call) “neighborhood quality.” As we 
discuss below, with respect to each of these kind of externalities, there is a 
general societal consensus—embodied in the law of property, environmental 
regulation and local zoning—that these kinds of externalities are the sort that 
generally should “count” in assessing social welfare.30 Moreover, although the 
nature and extent of these three kinds of externalities varies from place to place, 
they are all substantially at issue in our three case study states of Texas, 
Pennsylvania, and Colorado. We address each in turn. 
A. WATER SUPPLY AND QUALITY 
The type of fracking that has unlocked vast reserves of oil and gas from 
shales is called “slick water” fracking, and it requires large quantities of water.31 
As operators have perfected fracking in shales around the United States, water 
use per well has increased over time in most regions.32 The quantity of water 
used varies depending on whether the well is vertically drilled or drilled 
 
 29. See ALAMO AREA COUNCIL OF GOVTS., OIL AND GAS EMISSION INVENTORY, EAGLE FORD SHALE, 
TECHNICAL REPORT 9-1 (2014), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1109217-aacog-oil-%20and-gas-
emission-inventory-april-4-2014.html (noting that in Texas’s Eagle Ford shale region—host to many fracked 
wells—production “emitted 66 tons of NOX and 101 tons of VOC per ozone season day in 2011”); Peter M. 
Rabinowitz et al., Proximity to Natural Gas Wells and Reported Health Status: Results of a Household Survey 
in Washington County, Pennsylvania, 123 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 21, 24 (2015) (observing that “[r]eported 
upper respiratory symptoms were . . . more frequent among households < 1 km (39%) compared with households 
> 2 km from gas wells”). 
 30. The concept of externality has an uncertain and often unaddressed relationship to the concept of rights, 
including property rights. In welfare economics, anything could be an externality as long as it reduces the welfare 
of the party subject to the externality. Economics, from which the term externality is derived, takes as given the 
welfare function of individuals without judging as to what is included in the function. At the same time, implicit 
in most discussions of externalities is the idea that it is legitimate to weigh in social welfare the costs associated 
with the externality. If one steals cattle and then tries to graze them on a commons pasture being depleted by 
other people’s cattle, one is subject to an externality from the other people’s grazing practices, but it is arguable 
that that externality should not “count” in a social welfare calculus because the cattle were stolen. And from the 
perspective of how people and existing institutions on the ground actually react, it would seem plausible that 
there would be more resistance to institutional modifications to address externalities when there is no a question 
whether the parties bearing the externalities have legitimacy in complaining about them.   
 31. Hannah J. Wiseman, Risk and Response in Fracturing Policy, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 729, 744 (2013). 
 32.  A ndrew J. Kondash et al., The Intensification of the Water Footprint of Hydraulic Fracturing, SCI. 
ADVANCES, Aug. 15, 2018, at 2. This increase in water use is due largely to operators drilling longer lateral 
wellbores to access more oil and gas; more fracking solution is needed for longer wells. Jean-Philippe Nicot et 
al., Source and Fate of Hydraulic Fracturing Water in the Barnett Shale: A Historical Perspective, 48 
ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 2464, 2466 (2014). 
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horizontally, and depending on the type of shale being developed, but it is 
somewhere between three to five million gallons of water, or more, per well.33 
Some fracking companies withdraw water from underground sources by drilling 
a well on the well site, purchasing water from a municipality or water district 
that pumps and distributes water from an underground source, or purchasing 
water from other well owners.34 In other regions, fracking operators rely 
primarily on surface waters, and often water from small streams that can dry up 
quickly.35  
When many operators frack wells in one region at the same time—and rely 
on the same water source—this can cause serious short-term depletions in 
supply.36 This, in turn, can harm aquatic species or cause problematic short-term 
scarcity for other water users.37 From a broader perspective, the use of water for 
fracking pales in comparison to industrial, agricultural, and municipal uses, but 
the short-term effects on quantity are substantial.38 And in drought-prone 
regions, even relatively small users, including fracking companies, pose a 
longer-term concern.39  
Water quality externalities overlap substantially with water quantity 
because one of the best ways to reduce freshwater use for fracking is to reuse or 
recycle water from another fracked well. Liquid oil and gas wastes pose one of 
the greatest challenges to operators because of their potential to pollute 
environmental resources—particularly water—and they are one of the limiting 
factors to production. Every well drilled into a shale formation generates some 
amount of salty brine, called “produced water,” which comes up out of the well 
 
 33. Nicot et al., supra note 32. 
 34. Id. at 2468 (noting that much of the water for fracking in Fort Worth comes from the regional water 
district, although this district pumps water from surface reservoirs rather than underground sources, and that 
other municipalities also “provide water directly to operators”).   
 35. Sally Entrekin et al., Water Stress from High-Volume Hydraulic Fracturing Potentially Threatens 
Aquatic Biodiversity and Ecosystems in Arkansas, United States, 52 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 2349, 2354 (2018) 
(noting that the majority of water withdrawals for fracking in Arkansas were from small streams); Nicot et al., 
supra note 32, at 2464. 
 36. See, e.g., JAMES L. RICHENDERFER ET AL., WATER USE ASSOCIATED WITH NATURAL GAS SHALE 
DEVELOPMENT: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACTIVITIES MANAGED BY THE SUSQUEHANNA RIVER BASIN COMMISSION 
JULY 2008 THROUGH DECEMBER 2013, at 11 tbl.1 (2016), https://www.srbc.net/our-work/reports-
library/technical-reports/299-natural-gas-water-use-susquehanna/docs/water-use-natural-gas-report.pdf 
(showing 346 water use permits for fracking issued in one Pennsylvania county in 2010); cf. Press Release, 
Susquehanna River Basin Commission, 64 Water Withdrawals for Natural Gas Drilling and Other Uses 
Suspended to Protect Streams (July 16, 2012) https://www.srbc.net/about/news/news-release.html?id=90 
(noting that when streams drop below a minimum low flow level, as can occur when there are too many 
withdrawals for fracking, the SRBC requires withdrawals to temporarily cease).  
 37. See Entrekin et al., supra note 35, at 2350 (noting how fracking can cause water stress and defining 
water stress as “either the risk of water scarcity for people that is caused by increases in economic costs and 
competition among uses or as the extent and magnitude of altered natural streamflow that could result in loss of 
aquatic biodiversity and ecosystem function and services”). 
 38. See Nicot et al., supra note 32, at 2464 (noting that although total fracturing “water use estimates 
represent a small fraction of water used in each state . . . the volumes may be significant locally, depending on 
competition with other sectors”).  
 39. Id.  
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over its productive life.40 This water is often saltier than seawater; if stored, 
transported, and disposed of improperly it can pollute drinking water, kill plants 
and animals, and cause other serious environmental problems.41 Additional 
wastewater from fracked wells includes the fracking fluid itself, which flows out 
of the well after fracking ends and contains fracking chemicals.42 Produced 
water and flowback both contain low levels of naturally occurring radioactive 
materials and other toxic constituents.43 And both can be reused or recycled in 
other fracked wells—if other wells are under active development when the waste 
is generated—thus limiting the need to dispose of the wastes and providing a 
beneficial alternative to the use of freshwater for fracking.44 
Reuse involves directly using the produced water and flowback to frack 
another well without first treating the water, whereas recycling involves fracking 
with treated wastewater from another well.45 Despite their water quality and 
quantity benefits, recycling and reuse also have substantial externalities. They 
require holding large amounts of wastewater in large pits on site or in centralized 
holding ponds.46 The water is then transported to a plant for treatment and sent 
to another well for fracking, or it is directly trucked or piped to other wells. Spills 
can occur during all of these transfer points. Indeed, some states, like Michigan, 
prohibit the use of pits for storing salty wastewater due to concerns about 
discharges,47 and this largely prevents recycling and reuse. But other waste 
disposal options have substantial, and sometimes more harmful, externalities.48 
Recycling and reuse are common in some regions, such as parts of 
Colorado and much of Pennsylvania, but they appear to have been a primary 
means of disposing of drilling and fracking liquid wastes only in Pennsylvania.49 
The predominant disposal option for produced water and flowback water is to 
 
 40. The volume of produced water declines over time. Id. at 2468.  
 41. See T.L. Tasker et al., Environmental and Human Health Impacts of Spreading Oil and Gas 
Wastewater on Roads, 52 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 7081, 7089 (2018) (noting the potential for harm to aquatic life 
and human health).  
 42. See Andrea Vieth-Hillebrand et al., Characterizing the Variability in Chemical Composition of 
Flowback Water—Results from Laboratory Studies, 125 ENERGY PROCEDIA 136, 137 (2017).  
 43. Avner Vengosh et al., The Geochemistry of Hydraulic Fracturing Fluids, 17 PROCEDIA EARTH & 
PLANETARY SCI. 21, 23 (2017). 
 44. See Nicot et al., supra note 32, at 2464 (describing reuse from recycling). 
 45. See id. (differentiating and defining reuse from recycling). 
 46. See Michael Texter, Bureau of Waste Mgmt., Water Recycling/Oil and Gas Waste 9 (Jan. 15, 2015) 
(noting that wastewater to be reused is stored on or offsite).  
 47. Hydraulic Fracturing in Michigan, MICH. DEP’T OF ENV’T., GREAT LAKES, & ENERGY, 
https://www.michigan.gov/egle/0,9429,7-135-3311_4231-262172--,00.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2020) (noting 
that Michigan requires that produced water and flowback from fracked wells be contained in steel tanks rather 
than pits). 
 48. See infra notes 50–58 and accompanying text. 
 49. John A. Veil, Water Availability and Management in Shale Gas Operations (Sept. 26–29, 2010) 
http://www.gwpc.org/sites/default/files/event-sessions/12Veil_John.pdf (“In most shale gas plays, wastewater 
is disposed of through injection wells.”). More injection wells are now being drilled in Pennsylvania. See  U.S. 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGION III, UNDERGROUND INJECTION CONTROL PERMIT NO. PAS2D701BALL 
AUTHORIZATION TO OPERATE CLASS II-D INJECTION WELL (2018) (approving a commercial brine disposal well, 
effective Mar. 7, 2018). 
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inject the water underground into an underground injection control (UIC) well.50 
UIC wells are most commonly drilled into depleted oil and gas formations, 
which have open pore space into which wastewater can flow, or into other 
porous underground formations.51 These wells sometimes cause surface or 
groundwater contamination,52 and in states like Arkansas, Ohio, Oklahoma, and 
Texas, they have triggered earthquakes.53  
Other disposal outlets include discharging the water into surface water after 
treatment, and improper disposal can pollute the water and harm aquatic 
organisms. For produced water, but not flowback, some oil and gas operators 
also spread the water on the surface of land—either at the well site or 
elsewhere—or spray the water onto roads for dust or ice control.54 In states with 
few UIC wells, operators also previously sent flowback and produced water to 
publicly-owned treatment works (POTWs) that accept a variety of liquid 
domestic and industrial wastes, such as sewage. These plants then treat the waste 
and discharge it into surface waters. After studies showed that oil and gas waste 
sent to POTWs was inadequately treated and polluted surface waters when 
discharged, the EPA banned this practice,55 although the EPA is currently 
reconsidering the rule on remand from a court, and the compliance deadline has 
been extended.56 Additional oil and gas wastewater disposal methods include 
evaporating the waste on site in pits and disposing of it at commercial oil and 
gas waste facilities.57 
Beyond the wastewater disposal challenge, other substances at well sites 
have environmental externalities—and water quality impacts, in particular. 
Wastewater from drilling and fracking is typically stored in open pits on well 
 
 50. See Nicot et al., supra note 32, at 2469 (noting that most flowback from the Barnett Shale is disposed 
of in injection wells). 
 51. OHIO DEPT. OF NATURAL RESOURCES, UNDERGROUND INJECTION CONTROL (UIC) 
http://oilandgas.ohiodnr.gov/regulatory-sections/underground-injection-control (last updated Apr. 7, 2020) 
(noting that injection wells are drilled into depleted formations (those previously used to produce oil and gas) or 
brine-producing formations).  
 52. Jill E. Johnston et al., Wastewater Disposal Wells, Fracking, and Environmental Injustice in Southern 
Texas, 106 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 550, 550 (2016).  
 53. See, e.g., Cliff Frohlich et al., The Dallas-Fort Worth Earthquake Sequence: October 2008 Through 
May 2009, 101 BULL. SEISMOLOGICAL SOC’Y AMERICA 327 (2011); Cliff Frohlich, Two-Year Survey Comparing 
Earthquake Activity and Injection-Well Locations in the Barnett Shale, Texas, 109 PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 
13934 (2012); Katie M. Keranen et al., Potentially Induced Earthquakes in Oklahoma, USA: Links Between 
Wastewater Injection and the 2011 Mw 5.7 Earthquake Sequence, 41 GEOLOGY 699 (2013).  
 54. See Tasker et al., supra note 41, at 7082. 
 55. Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the Oil and Gas Extraction Point Source Category, 
81 Fed. Reg. 41,845, 41,853 (June 28, 2016) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 435 (2018)). But see Effluent Limitations 
Guidelines and Standards for the Oil and Gas Extraction Point Source Category—Implementation Date 
Extension, 81 Fed. Reg. 88,126, 88,126 (Dec. 7, 2016) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 435 (2018)) (proposing to allow 
grandfathered sources to continue discharging to POTWs after the compliance date).  
 56. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, UNCONVENTIONAL OIL AND GAS EXTRACTION EFFLUENT GUIDELINES, 
https://www.epa.gov/eg/unconventional-oil-and-gas-extraction-effluent-guidelines#compliance (last updated 
July 5, 2019). 
 57. JOHN VEIL, U.S. PRODUCED WATER VOLUMES AND MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN 2012, at 13 (2015). 
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sites, and these pits sometimes overflow and discharge wastes.58 Chemicals used 
for fracking—some of which are toxic—are transported to well sites in trucks 
and then stored on site before they are used, and they can spill during transport, 
storage, or use.59 Discharges of wastes and raw chemicals can pollute soil, 
surface water, and groundwater if they leak through permeable soil.60 Often, 
plastic liners or even thicker impervious materials that operators place on well 
sites catch spills and prevent them from contaminating soil or water.61 But not 
all well sites are lined in this manner. Many oil and gas operators rely on 
“secondary containment,” such as dikes dug around pits to catch contamination 
from overflowing pits or other sources of spills. But secondary containment 
sometimes fails.62 Surface discharges can also contaminate groundwater when 
they seep through soil.63 And finally, underground, methane, fracking 
chemicals, oil, and other substances can seep out of wells into groundwater or 
into rock, and then through a natural conduit to groundwater, if wells are 
improperly cased (lined with steel pipes and cement) or if the casing fails.64 
Although much groundwater contamination is the result of the drilling process 
or faulty casing—not fracking directly—the perception of groundwater 
contamination from fracked wells is strong.65  
 
 58. See, e.g., DEP’T OFFICE OF OIL & GAS MGMT, PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, COMPLIANCE REPORT 
1829700 (Sept. 19, 2009) (noting that a Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection inspector 
received an operator report of a “pit leak in flowback impoundment. Operator observed dead vegetation in farm 
field below well site. Wastewater leaked out of pit, entered drainage channel & sediment trap which overflowed 
thru sediment fencing into field.”).   
 59. See, e.g., DEP’T OFFICE OF OIL & GAS MGMT, PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, COMPLIANCE REPORT 
2172301 (June 5, 2013) (noting that while fracking chemicals were being blended onsite, 180 barrels spilled, 
two of which were discharged beyond containment areas on the site).  
 60. See Sherilyn A. Gross et al., Analysis of BTEX Groundwater Concentrations from Surface Spills 
Associated with Hydraulic Fracturing Operations, 63 J. AIR WASTE MGMT. ASS’N 424 (2013) (discussing the 
effects on groundwater); U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 26, at 5–50. 
 61. Gina Banai, Oral Presentation at University of Pittsburgh School of Law Energy Law & Policy Institute 
(Aug. 2, 2013) (showing and describing a well site with a “floor”). 
 62. See, e.g., DEP’T OFFICE OF OIL & GAS MGMT, PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, COMPLIANCE REPORT 
1957931 (Sept. 19, 2009) (noting a failure to properly store residual waste and concluding that the operator 
“needs to repair and maintain secondary containment”).  
 63. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 26, at 5–50.  
 64. See id. at 6–70 (noting two cases of hydraulic fracturing contributing to groundwater contamination, 
as well as noting the range of casing failure rates estimated by studies of wells in the Pennsylvania’s Marcellus 
Shale, with estimates ranging from three to ten percent of wells). 
 65. Anthony E. Ladd, Stakeholder Perceptions of Socioenvironmental Impacts from Unconventional 
Natural Gas Development and Hydraulic Fracturing in the Haynesville Shale, 28 J. RURAL SOC. SCI. 56, 74 
(2013) (noting that “[c]oncerns over the potential for fracking to contaminate local groundwater sources or 
aquifers were . . . reported by almost two-thirds” of respondents to a survey); Jason L. Weigle, Resilience, 
Community, and Perceptions of Marcellus Shale Development in the Pennsylvania Wilds: Reframing the 
Discussion, 27 SOC. VIEWPOINTS 3, 9 (2011) (noting that among many concerns voiced, groundwater 
contamination was among the most common). 
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B. NEIGHBORHOOD QUALITY  
The modern slick water method of fracking that has triggered a boom in 
domestic oil and gas development requires thousands of wells to be drilled and 
has thus impacted numerous individuals and the communities in which they live. 
And the growing literature addressing the risks of this practice suggests that risks 
fall largely at the local level, affecting broad aspects of the quality of life within 
communities.66 Largely because fracked wells can and have been established 
near homes and schools, fracking thus imposes what we term a “neighborhood 
amenity” or “quality externality”—an externality particular to the residents who 
live, work, or send their children to school near wells. These externalities include 
concerns about the fumes from fracking, noise and traffic hazard from trucks 
going to and from the wells, groundwater contamination, and the perception that 
overall proximity to wells poses a health risk.67 There is indeed research to 
support the view that residential proximity to fracking operations increases 
health risks.68  
These perceived, diverse, proximity-based externalities comprise much of 
what we include under the label “neighborhood quality.” But neighborhood 
quality also encompasses the distinct value or benefit of living in an aesthetically 
pleasing, quiet, (if you will) “picket fence” setting in which all or almost all uses 
are residential or otherwise “low impact.”69 This distinct value or benefit for 
property owners may account for a substantial increment of the market value of 
their properties.70  
Neighborhood quality thus includes both the idea of a neighborhood free 
from what might be regarded as common law nuisances and hazards and a 
neighborhood that has a scale, density, and appearance that conforms to a 
traditionally powerful conception of what is a nice neighborhood in which to 
live. Neighborhood quality captures exactly what has been, as a historic matter, 
 
 66. See David B. Spence, The Political Economy of Local Vetoes, 93 TEX. L. REV. 351, 367–68 (2014) 
(describing the local impacts). 
 67. See Ladd, supra note 65, at 75 (noting that one third of residents interviewed expressed concerns about 
“noise, dust, lights, and odors”); Thurka Sangaramoorthy et al., Place-based Perceptions of the Impacts of 
Fracking Along the Marcellus Shale, 151 SOC. SCI. & MED. 27, 33 (2016) (“[R]esidents expressed concern about 
environmental changes brought about by fracking operations such as increased traffic, land erosion and 
mudslides, wastewater, chemical runoff, and changes in air and water quality.”). 
 68. See Janet Currie et al., Hydraulic Fracturing and Infant Health: New Evidence from Pennsylvania, 3 
SCI. ADVANCES, Dec. 13, 2017, at 1 (showing lower birth weights of infants of mothers who live close to fracked 
well sites); Marsha Haley et al., Adequacy of Current State Setbacks for Directional High-Volume Hydraulic 
Fracturing in the Marcellus, Barnett, and Niobrara Shale Plays, 124 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 1323, 1330 (2016) 
(“Based on historical evacuations and thermal modeling, people within [state-regulated] setback distances are 
potentially vulnerable to thermal injury during a well blowout. According to air measurements and vapor 
dispersion modeling, the same populations are susceptible to benzene and hydrogen sulfide exposure above 
health-based risk levels.”). 
 69. The Supreme Court emphasized that preserving this type of setting is a value encompassed within the 
health, safety, and welfare of a community in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).  
 70. See generally LEE ANNE FENNELL, THE UNBOUNDED HOME: PROPERTY VALUES BEYOND PROPERTY 
LINES (2009) (describing the importance of neighborhood aesthetic and the disputes that arise over associated 
preferences).   
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a centerpiece of American zoning, dating back to the famous Euclid case in 
which the Supreme Court validated the right—in a sense the property right—of 
residential property owners to maintain physical distance between themselves 
and not only potentially loud and dangerous industrial uses but also uses that are 
inconsistent with the airiness and pleasantness of a low-density residential 
neighborhood.71 As Lee Fennell suggests, the idea that residents maintain a kind 
of property right to neighborhood quality—and hence that the externalities that 
threaten neighborhood quality “count” in social, political, and legal discourse—
is entrenched in our land use regime.72 
There is clearly some overlap between the water supply externality and 
water quality externality and what we call the neighborhood quality externality. 
But the neighborhood externality, in addition to encompassing costs 
unconnected to water quantity or quality, has a different scale from the other two 
externalities. Water supply and quality concerns can implicate geographic areas 
beyond a discrete neighborhood or single locality and may (and perhaps usually 
will) be based not simply on a single or cluster of fracking wells but rather on 
the cumulative effects of a large number of wells spread out over many miles. 
The difference in scale of the water supply and water quality externality as 
compared to the neighborhood quality externality means that different actors, 
different institutions, and a different number of actors and institutions may be 
involved. Most obviously, local governments would seem to be a more natural 
focal point for governance regarding the neighborhood externality than the water 
supply and quality externalities.  
The following Part explores these three types of often-overlapping 
externalities through case studies in three states, analyzing the extent to which 
the Demsetz thesis, as modified by subsequent legal scholarship, explains 
responses to growing externalities.  
II.  A QUALITATIVE EMPIRICAL TEST OF DEMSETZ  
Fracking—an industrial activity that has expanded rapidly, and in diverse 
areas—offers a prime test of the extent to which growing externalities generate 
Demsetzian responses. As we explored in the introduction, Demsetz theorized 
that increasing resource competition and associated externalities of resource use 
would make the costs of establishing and enforcing more clearly defined 
property rights in that resource worthwhile. The theory, as refined by subsequent 
legal, political, sociological, and economic research, is also consistent with the 
rise of innovative governance institutions and softer mechanisms for mediating 
the use of a commons, such as monitoring and community-industry agreements.  
 
 71. See Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 375, 388, 391. 
 72. See Fennell, supra note 15, at 16, 16 n.6 (“A family may privately own a house and the lot it sits on, 
but that family also holds interests in common with other households with respect to the neighborhood’s 
ambience and the community’s amenities . . . . [Z]oning grants even those who live in ordinary neighborhoods 
a form of collective property rights.” (footnote omitted)). 
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For the externalities of the fracking boom fleshed out in Part I, here we 
analyze state and community responses in Pennsylvania, Colorado, and Texas. 
We select these states because they have experienced some of the most 
substantial fracking activity, and they also provide diverse backdrops for testing 
the Demsetz theory, including different geographies and climates, 
environmental resources, historic resource production, law, culture, and politics. 
And, due to the location of shales beneath these states, the types of communities 
in which fracking occurs vary substantially.  
In Pennsylvania, a state that vacillates between Republican and Democratic 
tendencies,73 fracking has tended to occur in relatively rural communities 
dominated by industries such as agriculture.74 Although fossil fuel development 
was common relatively early in the state’s history, with coal mining and other 
extractive industries leaving a relatively heavy environmental footprint, the state 
had not experienced recent widespread natural gas development until the 
fracking boom hit.75 The state also has a very different legal regime from the 
perspective of water resources as compared to relatively arid Texas and 
Colorado. Pennsylvania follows English “riparian” water law, in which users 
must ensure that their water use does not negatively impinge on other users’ 
rights,76 whereas Texas and Colorado are prior appropriation “first in time” 
states, as we discuss in this Part.77 Further, part of Pennsylvania had relatively 
active regional governance institutions for water governance in place prior to the 
fracking boom.78  
Colorado is similar to Pennsylvania in that it has a history of resource 
extraction, but fracking has expanded development in parts of the state that had 
not recently experienced as much activity. Despite some similarities to 
Pennsylvania, it offers a helpful contrast with Pennsylvania’s characteristics in 
terms of its climate, geography, and location of fracking. Although fracking is 
also common in some relatively rural areas in Colorado, its direct externalities, 
such as air pollution, have also directly impacted the Denver metroplex.79 And 
Colorado is a “purple” state from a political perspective, hosting strongly 
 
 73. See Daniel Bush, “Are We a Red State or a Blue State?” Life in a Pennsylvania Swing County 100 
Days into Trump’s Presidency, PBS (Apr. 29, 2017, 11:36 AM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/red-
state-blue-state-life-pennsylvania-swing-county-100-days-trumps-presidency. 
 74. See, e.g., Yelena Ogneva-Himmelberger & Liyao Huang, Spatial Distribution of Unconventional Gas 
Wells and Human Populations in the Marcellus Shale in the United States: Vulnerability Analysis, 60 APPLIED 
GEOGRAPHY 165, 171 (2015) (showing that many wells were fracked in poor, rural areas). 
 75. Robinson Tp. v. Commonwealth of Pa. (Robinson II), 83 A.3d 901, 976 (Pa. 2013) (“Pennsylvania has 
a notable history of what appears retrospectively to have been a shortsighted exploitation of its bounteous 
environment.”). 
 76. See infra note 178 and accompanying text.  
 77. See infra notes 211–217 and accompanying text.  
 78. See infra notes 179–185 and accompanying text.   
 79. See Dale Wells, Air Pollution Control, Colo. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Env’t, Condensate Tank 
Emissions 2 (unpublished paper), https://www3.epa.gov/ttnchie1/conference/ei20/session6/dwells.pdf (noting 
that oil and gas development was a leading cause of air pollution in the Denver region). 
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divergent political views in part due to the influx of people from relatively liberal 
states, such as California.80  
Our final case study, Texas, tests the Demsetz thesis in another relatively 
arid state in which the oil and gas industry has long dominated and has been 
welcomed by many communities. The fracking boom in parts of Texas has been 
predominantly urban—with much of the development of the Barnett Shale, a 
natural gas-containing rock formation centered beneath the Fort Worth area81—
and predominantly rural in others. Unlike in Pennsylvania and Colorado, the 
Republican Party clearly reigns within Texas;82 the continued growth of urban 
areas in the state has threatened this dominance but has not made substantial 
inroads.  
The sections that follow explore the three major externality groups that we 
have identified for fracking—the neighborhood amenity, water quantity, and 
water quality externalities—within these three case study states.  
A. NEIGHBORHOOD QUALITY  
The effects of fracking at the local level are particularly pronounced, and 
the boom in activity as workers and equipment pour into towns might be 
expected to generate a classic Demsetzian response. Thousands of trucks travel 
to and from each fracked well site,83 generating noise, dust, air pollution, traffic 
congestion, and road damage. Generators, rig engines, and other equipment 
running on site are noisy and emit air pollution, and lights shine around the clock 
unless regulated.84 These and other community externalities are substantial in 
each of the states that we studied, but responses also varied substantially and did 
not consistently hew to a Demsetzian framework. 
1. Pennsylvania 
Before fracking became a reality in Pennsylvania, the state had a long 
history with other extractive industries, both conventional oil drilling and 
(famously) coal mining.85 Prior to the advent of fracking, localities’ rights to 
protect neighborhood quality were embodied in the Pennsylvania Municipalities 
Planning Code, which empowers localities to, among other things, zone for 
 
 80. Sam Brasch, Purple State Blues, COLO. PUB. RADIO (Oct. 11, 2018), 
http://www.cpr.org/news/purplish/purple-state-blues (noting a political scientist’s view that Colorado remains a 
purple state despite recent Democratic presidential candidate victories there).  
 81. See City of Fort Worth Gas Well Status February 2018, supra note 21.   
 82. See Ben Philpott, Why Is Texas So Red, and How Did It Get That Way?, HOUS. PUB. MEDIA (Oct. 31, 
2016, 6:30 AM), https://www.houstonpublicmedia.org/articles/news/politics/2016/10/31/174443/why-is-texas-
so-red-and-how-did-it-get-that-way/. 
 83. See CESAR QUIROGA ET AL., TEX. A&M TRANSP. INST., TRAFFIC LOADS FOR DEVELOPING AND 
OPERATING INDIVIDUAL WELLS 6 tbl.2 (2016), https://static.tti.tamu.edu/tti.tamu.edu/documents/409186/IR-16-
03.pdf (showing 5513 trucks required to frack and refrack an average well in the Barnett Shale region and 16,160 
trucks needed for this same purpose in the more rural Eagle Ford Shale region).  
 84. See, e.g., Sci. Advisory Bd., supra note 23, at 11 (providing a resident’s statement explaining that “the 
noise and generated dust . . . was impossible to keep from his windows”). 
 85. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.   
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permissible land uses.86 By and large, the Pennsylvania courts had held that 
localities are able to zone where conventional oil and gas drilling or mining 
occurs within a locality.87  
But the question remained whether the same interpretation would apply to 
fracked oil and gas wells, as this activity boomed in the Marcellus Shale and 
became a reality or potential reality for many localities. In 1996, a pre-fracking 
amendment to the Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act prohibited localities from 
imposing on oil and gas operations “conditions, requirements or limitations on 
the same features of oil and gas well operations regulated by” that Act.88 In terms 
of the neighborhood quality externality from fracking, the 1996 amendment left 
several questions open. These included whether the location of a fracked well 
was a “feature” of oil and gas operations or not, and whether setback 
requirements that require minimum distances between wells and residences, 
other structures, or water resources were an impermissible regulation of a feature 
of drilling.  
As Demsetz’s theory would predict, the rise of fracking and perceived 
neighborhood quality externalities has forced a greater specification of the 
relative rights of fracking operators to frack where they choose and 
neighborhoods to zone in such a way as to protect neighborhood quality. The 
specification, however, has not been linear.  
In 2009, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court read the 1996 amendment to 
only preempt local regulation of oil and gas operations to the extent such 
regulations addressed matters other than the location of drilling; localities could 
impose location restrictions to address local interests that the zoning power is 
designed to serve and that are distinct from state-wide economic and general 
public health considerations.89 The court explained that, while the State had an 
interest in uniformity, there was a distinct local interest protected by zoning that 
uniform state regulation could not adequately address—zoning controls that 
address overall “community development objectives.”90 
In 2012, the Pennsylvania legislature, in an explicit attempt to make 
Pennsylvania as friendly as possible to fracking, enacted a statute that expressly 
precluded all local zoning that would affect oil and gas operations, including 
partial or full exclusions of operations from a locality and any setback 
requirements exceeding those required by the state.91 The statute went so far as 
 
 86. 1968 Pa. Laws 170. 
 87. See, e.g., Nalbone v. Borough of Youngsville, 522 A.2d 1173, 1176 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987) (allowing 
zoning for oil and gas development).   
 88. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 601.602 (1996).  
 89. Huntley & Huntley v. Council of Oakmont, 964 A.2d 855, 866 (Pa. 2009) (allowing an “overall 
restriction on oil and gas wells” in a residential district); see also Range Res. Appalachia v. Salem Twp., 964 
A.2d 869 (Pa. 2009). 
 90. Huntley, 964 A.2d at 865. The court’s opinions, however, emphasized that local regulation of oil and 
gas siting could not exceed that generally encompassed within the zoning power. Id. at 860. 
 91. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2301–3504 (2020). 
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to require that local governments allow oil and gas development in every zoning 
district within the locality—even residential districts.92  
In 2013, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down the 
provisions related to local zoning and certain other portions of the 2012 Act, 
relying upon the 1971 Environmental Rights Amendment (ERA) of the state 
constitution.93 That Amendment, to which Pennsylvania Courts had previously 
given little effect,94 provides that “[t]he people have a right to clean air, pure 
water, and to the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values 
of the environment.”95 And the ERA includes an affirmative mandate: as trustee 
of the State’s natural resources, “the Commonwealth shall conserve and 
maintain them for the benefit of all the people.”96  
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court interpreted the ERA as a response to a 
history of environmental degradation in Pennsylvania, including degradation 
from coal mining.97 In striking down a provision of the 2012 law that would 
prohibit any local zoning restrictions regarding fracking operations, the court 
explained that the resulting environmental degradation would be inconsistent 
with the entrustment of natural resources in the Commonwealth for the benefit 
of all people, including future generations.98  
After the Robinson II decision in 2013 and a Robinson III opinion in 2016 
that reinforced and extended the court’s previous holdings,99 it is clear that in 
Pennsylvania a locality may partially or wholly exclude fracking operations as 
long as it does so in a way that is rationally related to permissible goals of 
zoning—notably, maintaining the aesthetic character of a locality and 
preservation of local environmental resources.100 It is also clear that local 
setback provisions, as long as they are rationally related to permissible zoning 
objectives, are lawful.101  
However, the Robinson decisions do not unambiguously address all the 
concerns that might be housed under the term neighborhood quality externality. 
First, the decisions do not purport to overturn prior case law affirming that the 
state may require uniformity in the regulation of actual oil and gas operations, 
including such things as casing requirements and natural gas transport and waste 
disposal requirements.102 At the same time, the decisions emphasize that the flaw 
 
 92. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3304 (2020). 
 93. Robinson II, 83 A.3d 901, 901 (Pa. 2013). 
 94. See generally John C. Dernbach, Taking the Pennsylvania Constitution Seriously When It Protects the 
Environment: Part II—Environmental Rights and Public Trust, 104 DICK. L. REV. 97 (1999) (exploring previous 
applications of the Environmental Rights Amendment).  
 95. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Robinson II, 83 A.3d at 944. 
 98. Id. at 979–80. 
 99. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth of Pa. (Robinson III), 147 A.3d 536 (Pa. 2016).  
 100. Id. at 566. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See 25 PA. CODE § 95.10 (2020) (requiring treatment of wastewater prior to sending it to a wastewater 
treatment plant); 25 PA. CODE § 78.83 (establishing casing requirements).   
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of the 2012 statute (in part) was that it deprived localities of a right to take action 
to address “a distinctive local environmental issue of importance to the residents 
of the municipality,”103 and the ERA upon which the court relied references the 
people’s right to air and pure water. There is thus ambiguity in the decisions as 
to what—beyond location restrictions and setback mandates—localities may be 
permitted to require from fracking operators.  
Second, the Robinson decisions affirm the rights of localities but not of 
specific neighbors vis-a-vis fracking operations: neighbors concerned about 
fracking coming to their area can only do something about it if they command 
the attention and support of the local politicians making local zoning law. And 
in fact, much of the post-Robinson litigation seems to involve residents who are 
aggrieved that their locality is not doing enough to restrict fracking near them.104 
For discrete groups of residents, it is possible that the perceived neighborhood 
quality externality from new fracking wells would be large but the locality 
nonetheless would do nothing because the perceived benefits of the fracking for 
the locality as a whole outweigh the costs to the aggrieved residents, or because 
industry money and power have distorted local politics.105  
With these caveats, it is reasonable to conclude that the Pennsylvania story 
today tracks Demsetz’s theory. With new technology, a resource once thought 
to have little economic value—Marcellus Shale natural gas—becomes the target 
of intense economic activity. This intensification of resource use generated or 
threatened to generate neighborhood quality externalities, and political and then 
legal conflict ensued. The exact property rights of the resource users (fracking 
companies) were specified, over several years of contestation, to include rights 
to operate free of essentially all local regulation as to the process of drilling but 
subject to local area location and setback restrictions. These kinds of restrictions, 
in the aggregate, have the potential to reduce the overall neighborhood quality 
externalities of fracking by forcing fracking operators to internalize the costs of 
not operating at all in localities where neighbors see such operations as a large 
threat and, in other localities, by limiting the density of wells and the range of 
allowable site selection choices.106 
 
 103. Robinson III, 147 A.3d at 561. 
 104. See, e.g., Frederick v. Allegheny Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 196 A.3d 677 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2018) 
(challenging a local ordinance that allowed oil and gas development in all districts within the municipality); 
Gorsline v. Bd. of Supervisors of Fairfield Twp., 186 A.3d 375 (Pa. 2018) (challenging a local government’s 
grant of a conditional use permit for a well). 
 105. JEFFREY M. BERRY ET AL., RAPPAPORT CTR., POWER AND INTEREST GROUPS IN CITY POLITICS (2006), 
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/rappaport/files/berry_interest_groups.pdf (exploring the 
extent to which capture arises at the local level); Richard G. Newell & Daniel Raimi, Shale Public Finance: 
Local Government Revenues and Costs Associated with Oil and Gas Development 67 (Natl. Bureau of Econ., 
Working Paper No. 21542, 2015), https://www.nber.org/papers/w21542.pdf (describing local officials in certain 
Pennsylvania townships who cited “net positive financial impact” from fracking). 
 106. See, e.g., 1968 Pa. Laws 247, ch. 6, art. VI, § 603 (listing oil and gas wells as a conditional use within 
all zoning districts).  
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2. Colorado  
The neighborhood quality externality has been the subject of intense 
contestation in Colorado, and for good reasons. The heart of oil and gas fracking 
in Colorado is the Front Range, the home of heavily-populated Boulder County 
and fast-growing Weld County. Weld County alone already has more than 
23,000 active wells.107 As the New York Times reported, “[d]rilling applications 
in the state have risen 70 percent in . . . [one] year, while the area north of 
Denver is expected to double in population by 2050.”108 Thus, the collision of 
drilling with suburban and urban living is at least as marked in Colorado as it is 
in Texas or Pennsylvania.  
At the same time, the cultural, political, and economic realities of Colorado 
foster polarization over fracking. Like Pennsylvania and unlike Texas, Colorado 
is not usually described as an oil and gas-industry-dominated state, but it is a 
state where extractive industries have a long history and have usually been 
encouraged by state and local government.109 At the same time, Colorado has 
very strong environmentalist forces at the state (and not just local) level that are 
generally hostile to fossil fuel extraction and sensitive to risks of environmental 
harm.110 For these reasons, a wider range of possible outcomes regarding the 
legal treatment of fracking at the state level is conceivable in Colorado, ranging 
from relatively modest regulation to very strict regulation bordering on a partial 
ban.  
We see this possible range in outcomes in the back-and-forth over fracking 
in Colorado politics in recent years. First there was a movement to place on the 
ballot a strongly anti-fracking referendum in 2014.111 That was followed by a 
gubernatorial task force charged with a near-impossible mission: to find a 
peaceful compromise among industry, local government, and environmentalist 
forces.112 Peace has not prevailed, and there has been continued contestation 
over the legal status of fracking at the state level. Anti-fracking forces were able 
 
 107. Troy E. Swain, Weld County Oil & Gas Update (2018), https://www.weldgov.com/ 
UserFiles/Servers/Server_6/File/Departments/Planning%20&%20Zoning/Oil%20and%20Gas/Updates/Oil%2
0%20Gas%20Update%20APR%202018.pdf. 
 108. Turkewitz, supra note 23. 
 109. See Swain, supra note 107 (advertising and championing the fact that Weld County hosts 90% of 
Colorado’s oil development); Cary Weiner, Oil and Gas Development in Colorado, COLO. STATE UNIV. 
EXTENSION (2014), https://mountainscholar.org/bitstream/handle/10217/185140/AEXT_106392014.pdf? 
sequence=1&isAllowed=y (noting initial exploration wells as early as 1881 and a substantial increase in drilling 
activity in the 1990s); see also Charles Davis, The Politics of “Fracking”: Regulating Natural Gas Drilling 
Practices in Colorado and Texas, 29 REV. POL’Y RES. 177, 185 (2012) (“Colorado has historically been a 
probusiness state in terms of facilitating industry access to the development of natural resources, including 
natural gas.”). 
 110. Id. at 186 (noting the “size and importance of the environmental policy constituency in Colorado”).  
 111. Maeve Reston, Deal Will Keep Fracking Battle Off Colorado Ballot, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2014, 10:52 
PM), https://www.latimes.com/nation/politics/politicsnow/la-pn-colorado-deal-fracking-ballot-20140804-
story.html. 
 112. OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, STATE OF COLO., EXEC. ORDER NO. B 2014 005 (2014), 
https://firebasestorage.googleapis.com/v0/b/torid-heat-3070.appspot.com/o/Programs%2FOGTF%2FEO 
CreatingOGTaskForce.pdf?alt=media&token=752981f0-ae9c-45bf-8ad1-2cd5063ad530. 
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to place on the 2018 ballot a referendum that would have mandated a 2500 foot 
minimum setback for wells throughout the state.113 The referendum did not pass 
but garnered forty-three percent of the vote, despite a massive opposition 
campaign by the oil and gas industry.114 Most recently, the election of a new 
governor sparked a state-level effort to enhance environmental and community-
based productions relating to oil and gas development. The sweeping Senate Bill 
181, enacted by the state legislature and signed by the governor in 2019, requires 
the state oil and gas agency to promulgate stricter controls of air emissions from 
oil and gas exploration and production, promulgate a variety of other 
environmental rules, such as rules to ensure well integrity, and write rules that 
would require companies to consider alternative locations for oil and gas 
activities proposed near populated areas.115 Additionally, the bill gives clear and 
relatively extensive powers to local governments to regulate oil and gas 
development, including, among others, the location and siting of wells and other 
facilities, requirements for financial securities and insurance, and “[a]ll other 
nuisance-type effects of oil and gas development.”116 The bill also gives local 
governments general planning powers for “orderly use of land and protection of 
the environment” and allows them to inspect facilities, impose fines, and levy 
permitting fees.117  
Past political uncertainty at the state level—particularly as to the range of 
legally permissible local regulation of fracking—has produced in Colorado one 
type of Demsetzian outcome that we do not see in Texas or Pennsylvania to any 
substantial extent. This outcome consists of contractual, purportedly enforceable 
agreements between localities and fracking operators that set forth the relative 
rights of the locality and the fracking operators and that, in some respects, go 
beyond state regulatory requirements.118 
Prior to the fracking boom, Colorado law was ambiguous as to the rights 
of localities to adopt regulation affecting oil and gas drilling. On the one hand, 
Colorado has long had an agency devoted to oil and gas regulation—the 
Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission (COGCC)—and, even before 
the fracking boom, the state had fairly comprehensive regulations governing 
drilling, production, and waste disposal.119 By 2008, the State had adopted a set 
of fracking-specific regulations, which have been modified and expanded 
 
 113. John Aguilar, Prop 112 Fails as Voters Say No to Larger Setbacks for Oil and Gas, DENVER POST 
(Nov. 6, 2018, 7:13 PM), https://www.denverpost.com/2018/11/06/colorado-proposition-112-results/. 
 114. Id. 
 115. S. 19-181, Reg. Sess., at §§ 3, 12 (Colo. 2019) (adding 25-7-109 to the Colorado Revised Statutes, and 
amending 34-6-106, respectively).  
 116. Id. at § 4 (adding 29-20-104 to the Colorado Revised Statutes).  
 117. Id.  
 118. See infra notes 135–143 and accompanying text.  
 119. See COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:100 (proposed 2008) (showing 173 pages of rules and substantial 
changes in 2008, including some changes specific to fracking). 
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substantially since then.120 Thus, as early as 2008—and until legislative 
clarification emerged in 2019—there was a basis for the argument that the state 
had occupied the field of fracking regulation and/or that stricter local regulation 
and local bans would present an operational conflict with state regulation and 
thus be preempted on that basis. 
On the one hand, Colorado is a strong “home rule” state: the state 
constitution confers on home rule localities a right to legislate on matters of local 
concern even in the face of a conflicting state statute.121 There is pre-fracking 
boom precedent in Colorado that suggests a reasonably high hurdle for energy 
producers who seek to invalidate local zoning regulation on the basis of 
operational conflict preemption. In Board of County Commissioners of La Plata 
County v. Bowen/Edwards Assocs., the Colorado Supreme Court held that 
Colorado’s Oil and Gas Conservation Act does not wholly preempt a county 
“from exercising its land-use authority over any and all aspects of oil and gas 
development and operations within the county.”122 In Voss v. Lundvall Bros, the 
Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the invalidation of a total ban on drilling 
enacted by a home rule municipality, but at the same time acknowledged that 
home rule city land use regulations on oil and gas development that could be 
harmonized with state law should stand.123  
As Demsetz’s theory would suggest, the explosion in drilling in Colorado 
created pressure for a greater specification of property rights and in particular a 
specification of the limits, if any, that could be imposed on fracking operations 
in the interest of tempering neighborhood quality externalities. With respect to 
setbacks, the nexus of activity was the COGCC, which in 2013 adopted one of 
the strictest state minimum setback regulations in the United States.124 State 
permitting regulations also were reformed to, at least in theory, mandate more 
local input and more consideration of environmental factors.125  
As in Texas, it was a local ban on fracking and another local long-term 
moratorium that spawned major litigation to further clarify rights in the context 
 
 120. See, e.g., COLO. CODE REGS. §§ 404-1:337, 906 (2013) (showing final spill reporting rules adopted in 
2013); COLO. CODE REGS. §§ 305A, 604.c.(4), 302.c. (2016) (showing rules regulating wells in urban areas); 
COLO. CODE REG. § 609 (2012) (showing a rule requiring testing of groundwater prior to drilling). 
 121. COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6. 
 122. 830 P.2d 1045, 1048 (Colo. 1992). 
 123. 830 P.2d 1061, 1069 (Colo. 1992). The key ambiguity that the Colorado Court did not resolve is the 
meaning of “can be harmonized with the development and production of oil and gas in a manner consistent with 
the stated goals of the Oil and Gas Conservation Act.” Id. 
 124. COLO. CODE REGS. § 604 (2013) (showing, effective 2013, a requirement that wells and production 
facilities to be 500 feet from building units); Hannah J. Wiseman & Francis Gradijan, Regulation of Shale Gas 
Development, Including Hydraulic Fracturing 45 (June 15, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (showing other state 
setback requirements for oil and gas wells from buildings ranging from 150 feet to 1000 feet, with only Maryland 
and West Virginia exceeding the 500-foot requirements). In 2018 the COGCC also adopted a setback rule 
requiring a 1,000-foot setback from building units and high occupancy units such as schools and nursing 
facilities. COLO. CODE REGS. § 604 (2018). 
 125. COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:216 (2008) (providing, in a 2008 rule revision, incentives for operators that 
chose to enter into comprehensive drilling plans, which included provisions to protect “public health, safety, 
welfare, and the environment” and involved numerous parties in drafting the plans).  
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of neighborhood quality. At the local level, by 2014, there were a number of 
major Colorado localities that had adopted bans or five-year moratoria on 
fracking or were poised to do so.126 The oil and gas industry petitioned the 
Colorado Supreme Court to resolve the question of where local authority ended 
with respect to fracking, but, unlike in Pennsylvania, the Colorado Supreme 
Court offered a specification of rights that favored the oil and gas industry. That 
specification, however, did not resolve all the ambiguity.  
In City of Longmont v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n,127 the Colorado Supreme 
Court affirmed a trial court decision invalidating a Longmont ordinance that 
prohibited hydraulic fracturing and the storage of associated wastes in 
Longmont.128 As had the trial court, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the 
ordinance was not expressly or impliedly preempted by the Colorado legislature 
but rather was preempted on the basis of an “operational conflict.”129 The court 
found that a total ban would frustrate the state statutory goals of promoting 
efficient, non-wasteful development of oil and gas resources, consistent with the 
protection of public health and welfare and the environment.130 The court 
rejected the more extreme argument put forth by industry that “the [State] 
Commission has the exclusive authority to regulate the technical aspects of oil 
and gas operations and that such technical” regulation by a locality “constitutes 
a de facto operational conflict.”131 At the same time, the court held that the State 
interest in uniformity in fracking regulations would be undermined by a local 
ban.132  
The court followed similar reasoning in another case decided the same day, 
holding in City of Fort Collins v. Colorado Oil & Gas Ass’n that a long-term 
five-year moratorium on fracking was also operationally preempted.133 The 
Longmont and Fort Collins decisions could be read to preempt only local bans 
and moratoria, or more broadly to preempt local regulation of fracking that is 
stricter than state requirements.134 The 2019 legislation granting local 
governments relatively broad regulatory powers largely quashed this latter 
interpretation, but the issue remained unsettled until then.  
 
 126. Joel Minor, Local Government Fracking Regulations: A Colorado Case Study, 33 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 
59, 110–11 (2013). 
 127. 369 P.3d 573 (Colo. 2016).  
 128. Id. at 577. 
 129. Id. at 584. 
 130. Id. at 584–85.  
 131. Id. at 585. 
 132. Id. (“The Oil and Gas Conservation Act and the Commission’s pervasive rules and 
regulations . . . convince us that the state’s interest in the efficient and responsible development of oil and gas 
resources includes a strong interest in the uniform regulation of fracking.”). 
 133. Id. at 586. 
 134. The one of the few (if only) post-Longmont and Fort Collins cases to date, an ordinance from the 
locality of Thornton adopting a mandatory setback that exceeds the state standard by 250 feet, was recently 
struck down by a trial court, which agreed with the industry’s expansive reading of the Longmont and Fort 
Collins decisions. Cathy Proctor, Judge Rules Part of Thornton’s Oil and Gas Regs Violates State, Federal Law, 
DENVER POST (Apr. 25, 2018, 10:50 AM) https://www.bizjournals.com/denver/news/2018/04/25/judge-rules-
part-of-thornton-s-oil-and-gas-regs.html. 
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Both before and after a win in the Colorado Supreme Court in 2016, 
fracking permit applicants have been willing to strike compromise deals with 
localities in the form of memoranda of understanding (MOUs) that, on their face, 
impose contractually binding obligations beyond those imposed by state law.135 
As already suggested, one motivation for industry’s embrace of MOUs might be 
the polarization in the Colorado politics of fracking; given the realistic 
possibility of strict state regulation in the future or express state authorization of 
local bans, it may be reasonable for industry both to try to temper anger and 
resentment at the local level—which, of course, can fuel state-level anti-fracking 
efforts—and to secure the necessary local approvals as fast as possible. 
Localities have explicitly offered streamlined, expedited local permitting in 
return for an applicant’s willingness to negotiate a MOU.136 Good will in the 
community—a social license to operate, so to speak—might also be a motivation 
for the industry’s substantial embrace of MOUs: whatever the formal state and 
local law, it is easier for operators to do business if they have at least some local 
goodwill.137  
The MOUs vary from locality to locality but often address common 
subjects, including setbacks (especially wellhead setbacks from residential and 
other high-occupancy buildings and waste pit setbacks from residences and 
wellheads); roads (especially ways to minimize dust and congestion on roads); 
air quality (ranging from dust control to vapor capture and limits on flaring; 
noise prevention and mitigation); disclosure of chemicals added to water as part 
of fracking; required procedures for chemical and waste storage, emergency 
planning, and spill response; and wildlife habitat protection.138 Typically, the 
 
 135. See Austin Shaffer et al., Memoranda of Understanding and the Social Licence to Operate in 
Colorado’s Unconventional Energy Industry: A Study of Citizen Complaints, 35 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES 
L. 69, 71 (2017) (noting the increasingly common use of MOUs in Colorado). There are many types of 
“supraregulatory” agreements that communities can enter into, but MOUs appear to have been the most common 
form in Colorado. Other agreements include, inter alia, impact and benefit agreements, in which communities 
receive money or in-kind donations from industry in exchange for cooperating with development; environmental 
agreements, in which industry commits to mitigation of certain impacts; and socioeconomic agreements, which 
address “broader” economic considerations and can involve industry commitments to benefit the locality or 
region by, for example, hiring local employees. Lindsay Galbraith et al., Towards a New Supraregulatory 
Approach to Environmental Assessment in Northern Canada, 25 IMPACT ASSESSMENT & PROJECT APPRAISAL 
27, 28 (2007). Good neighbor agreements, in turn, give communities information about extraction operations, 
voice concerns about impacts, and address those concerns. Sarah M. Zuzulock & James R. Kuipers, The Good 
Neighbour Agreement: A Proactive Approach to Water Management Through Community Enforcement of Site-
Specific Standards, 53 GREENER MGMT. INT’L 73, 73 (2006); see also Tara Righetti, Contracting for Sustainable 
Surface Management, 71 ARK. L. REV. 367, 385 (2018) (describing these and other types of agreements and 
providing sources).  
 136. See, e.g., Kristen van de Biezenbos, Contracted Fracking, 92 TUL. L. REV. 587, 634–35 (2018) 
(discussing streamlining or expediting of permits as an incentive for industry to enter contracts with localities); 
see also RockPick, Arapahoe County OKs Agreement to Expedite Fracking Applications, NIOBRARA NEWS 
(Apr. 3, 2013), https://www.niobraranews.net/hydrofracking/arapahoe-county-oks-agreement-expedite-
fracking-applications. 
 137. Shaffer et al., supra note 135, at 70. 
 138. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding from City of Brighton 3, 11, 12 (May 11, 2015), 
http://www.oilandgasbmps.org/docs/CO166_Brighton_Model_MOU.PDF (requiring “noise mitigation 
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operator agrees to include the MOU as an attachment to its permit from the state 
agency. Some of these requirements may go to matters not covered by state 
regulation, but some clearly do. For example, the City of Brighton MOU 
requires operators to use “best efforts to locate the wellhead or Production 
Facility outside of the buffer zone—at least 1,500’ from any High Occupancy 
Building Unit,”139 but the state rule enhancing setbacks in 2018 has as the 
maximum required setback only 1000 feet.140 
The MOUs, to be sure, are not without their critics. While the agreements 
purport to be enforceable on their face and typically are incorporated by 
reference into COGCC permits, it is unclear whether the COGCC would seek to 
enforce their terms in the event MOU non-compliance came to light.141 A 
locality presumably could go to court for enforcement, and some agreements 
specifically recite the right of the parties to the MOU to obtain injunctive relief 
in court,142 but a court might question whether there is adequate, lawful 
consideration for the MOU as a contract. Even if MOUs are subject to state 
agency or court-ordered enforcement, many of the MOUs lack specific 
monitoring and reporting requirements, so violations might go unnoticed. 
MOUs, too, sometimes alienate activists within the community and, as 
compromise measures, may engender lukewarm enthusiasm at best.143  
Whatever their arguable limits, MOUs do help specify rights to a greater 
degree than the background Colorado law. As genuine compromise measures, 
they encourage greater internalization of neighborhood externality costs than 
otherwise would occur. In this sense, they fully track Demsetz’s theory. 
Moreover, by creating a framework for ongoing, joint governance on the part of 
industry and the locality, MOUs would seem to represent what Smith calls a 
 
measures,” “air quality mitigations,” “Fugitive Dust suppression,” and other measures). The Intermountain Oil 
and Gas BMP Project maintains a database of MOUs, identifying the different features of the MOUs. Database 
of MOU BMPs, INTERMOUNTAIN OIL AND GAS BMPS, http://www.oilandgasbmps.org/resources/MOU-
database-BMPS.php. 
 139. Memorandum of Understanding from City of Brighton, supra note 138, at 2.  
 140. COLO. CODE REGS. § 604 (2020). The MOU approved by Broomfield in 2017 requires that company 
to “agree[] to use quieter, state-of-the-art drilling equipment; install[] pipelines to cut back on truck traffic and 
on-site storage; adher[e] to setbacks that go farther than what state law mandates; and remov[e] old wells and 
storage tanks in neighborhoods on both sides of the county line.” John Aguilar, Broomfield Approves Oil and 
Gas Deal After Knock-Down, Drag-Out Fight, DENVER POST, https://www.denverpost.com/2017/10/24/ 
extraction-oil-gas-drilling-memorandum-broomfield-city-council-meeting/ (last updated Oct. 25, 2017, 11:48 
AM).  
 141. For sources questioning whether MOU terms are or will be enforced by state regulators, see Shaffer et 
al., supra note 135, at 72 n.13; Skylar Zilliox & Jessica M. Smith, Supraregulatory Agreements and 
Unconventional Energy Development: Learning from Citizen Concerns, Enforceability and Participation in 
Colorado, EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES AND SOC’Y 69, 72 (2016).   
 142. Industry groups at this point do not dispute MOU’s enforceability. Cf. Anatomy of an MOU, 
INTERMOUNTAIN OIL AND GAS BMP PROJECT, https://www.oilandgasbmps.org/resources/MOU-anatomy.php 
(noting enforcement provisions within MOUs between industry and local governments in Colorado) (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2020). The same issues have been raised with respect to Community Benefits Agreements entered into 
by developers to facilitate redevelopment plans.   
 143. Skylar Zilliox & Jessica M Smith, Colorado’s Fracking Debates: Citizen Science, Conflict and 
Collaboration, 27 SCI. AS CULTURE 221, 237–39 (2018); Zilliox & Smith, supra note 141, at 71. 
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governance solution to a commons problem.144 Notably, MOUs are not 
perpetual: some localities already are in their second iteration of MOUs, and, 
over time, MOUs may come to address more aspects of the neighborhood quality 
externality and do so in more effective and (for industry) less expensive ways.145 
Colorado’s MOUs provide an example of how technological innovation—
in this case, in oil and gas extraction—can facilitate institutional innovation. 
Impact benefit agreements, which often include environmental management 
provisions, have been used outside the United States by the mining industry and 
largely in connection with indigenous or aboriginal communities with legal 
claims to resources under treaty or other law. In the context of agreements with 
First Nations in Canada at least, these MOUs do purport to be binding 
contracts.146 In the United States, community benefit agreements have been 
commonly used in connection with large-scale urban real estate developments, 
but these agreements do not purport to govern technical aspects of an extractive 
operation, and they typically are understood to have limited duration.147 MOUs 
in Colorado are thus an innovation for the oil and gas industry in the United 
States and, indeed, for domestic extractive industries generally. In their 
regulation by binding contract of an ongoing, essentially industrial activity, they 
represent a distinctive form of governance in response to growing externalities.  
3. Texas 
The fracking boom began in Texas before it did elsewhere—indeed, it is 
where the combination of slick water fracturing and horizontal drilling that 
triggered the nationwide boom was first perfected.148 There has, as a result, been 
more time for the legal system to adapt to intensive resource use and the 
associated externalities. One of those externalities—the neighborhood quality 
externality—has been especially prominent in Texas because so much drilling 
and fracking has focused on the populated Fort Worth metropolitan area, which 
is at the heart of the Barnett Shale play. Between 2005 and 2010, over 12,000 
wells were drilled in that area,149 and there are currently nearly 2,000 active 
wells within the city limits.150 Stories abound of wells pressing up against 
 
 144. Smith, supra note 5, at 294. 
 145. See Skylar Zilliox & Jessica M. Smith, Memorandums of Understanding and Public Trust in Local 
Government for Colorado’s Unconventional Energy Industry, 107 ENERGY POL’Y 72, 79 (2017). 
 146. See, e.g., Nelson Bennett, LNG Canada Sets Examples, Says First Nations Leader, May 29, 2019, JWN 
Energy, https://www.jwnenergy.com/article/2019/5/lng-canada-sets-example-says-first-nations-leader/ 
(describing a binding contract in the liquefied natural gas terminal context).  
 147. Patricia E. Salkin, Understanding Community Benefit Agreements: Opportunities and Traps for 
Developers, Municipalities and Community Organizations, https://community-wealth.org/sites/ 
clone.community-wealth.org/files/downloads/article-salkin.pdf; see also van de Biezenbos, supra note 136, at 
593–94 (comparing Colorado’s MOUs to other forms of industry agreements with local communities). 
 148. See Golden & Wiseman, supra note 12, at 974–75. 
 149. High Benzene Levels Found on Barnett Shale, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Jan. 28, 2010, 9:17 AM), 
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/texas/2010/01/28/High-benzene-levels-found-on-Barnett-3021. 
 150. See City of Fort Worth Gas Well Status February 2018, supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
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residences, sandwiched into lots bordering schools.151 Although populated areas 
of Texas are familiar with conventional drilling in their backyards,152 the current 
intense push for drilling in essentially urban and suburban areas has no 
precedent. And residents have taken notice, of course, complaining about 
essentially industrial operations and their possible adverse effects close to where 
they live and work.153  
Demsetz’s theory would suggest that the rise of urban and suburban drilling 
in Texas would lead to a greater specification of the relative rights of owners of 
fracking operations and owners of nearby parcels. And, in fact, this has proven 
true, with neighbors claiming rights in the form of local regulation.154 As in 
Pennsylvania and Colorado, however, this specification has hardly been linear. 
As discussed below, localities sought to unilaterally specify limits on fracking 
operators’ rights and did so to a large extent, and then the Texas legislature in 
turn restricted the scope of local discretion in specifying the rights of fracking 
operators.155 In contrast with Pennsylvania, and contrary to Demsetz’s theory, 
the overall result of the rights specification has not been to force the 
internalization of fracking’s external costs so much as to assure operators that 
they can continue to impose external costs in the form of reduced neighborhood 
quality.  
Texas legal institutions, notably the legislature and courts, have long 
supported the oil and gas industry, which undergirds the Texas economy to a 
very substantial degree.156 At the same time, Texas is also a state that confers 
home rule authority on communities larger than 5000 residents,157 and that has 
a legal tradition of empowering localities with substantial authority over local 
land use. Prior to the fracking boom, localities were reasonably successful in 
litigation against the oil and gas industry.158 Thus, prior to the explosion of 
 
 151. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 152. Tysco Oil Co. v. R.R. Comm’n of Tex., 12 F. Supp. 195, 197 (S.D. Tex. 1935) (describing wells in 
Houston and local regulation of those wells). 
 153. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.  
 154. Many local governments in Texas have lengthy ordinances that address drilling and fracking. See, e.g., 
FORT WORTH, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES, ch. 15 (2014); Flower Mound, Tex. Ordinance No. 29-11 (July 18, 
2011); Flower Mound, Tex., Ordinance No. 36-11 (Aug. 1, 2011); Arlington, Tex., Ordinance No. 19-031 (May 
21, 2019).  
 155. However, Texas “grandfathered in” local governments that had regulated the industry for at least five 
years without overly impeding development. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 81.0523(d) (West 2015).  
 156. See Davis, supra note 109, at 182 (observing that oil and gas industry businesses accounted for twenty 
percent of Texas’s economy in 2012). 
 157. TEX. CONST. art. XI, § 5. 
 158. See, e.g., City of Mont Belvieu v. Enter. Prod. Operating, 222 S.W.3d 515, 521 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007) 
(holding that local ordinance regulating drilling in connection with an underground salt-dome hydrocarbon 
storage facility was not preempted by Texas state law); Klepak v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 177 S.W.2d 215, 218 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1944) (affirming the legality of the City of Tomball’s Oil and Gas regulation); David J. Klein, 
Home Sweet Home: Clarifying and Reinforcing a Municipality’s Authority to Regulate Natural Gas Activities 
in Its Corporate Limits, 14 TEX. TECH ADMIN. L.J. 339, 355 (arguing, before House Bill 40, that Texas law 
preferred co-regulation of natural gas production by the state and locality). See generally Bruce M. Kramer, 
Local Land Use Regulation of Extractive Industries: Evolving Judicial and Regulatory Approaches, 14 UCLA 
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fracking in populated North Texas, it was unclear how much localities could 
regulate—and even regulate to the point of banning—fracking under Texas law. 
As fracking boomed, localities responded by promulgating detailed 
ordinances addressing everything from mandatory environmental liability 
insurance to the use of closed tanks for waste storage.159 They also established 
laws that required far greater setbacks between new wells and residences, high-
occupancy building and waterways than the state required. For example, the City 
of Flower Mound in North Texas enacted a 1500 foot setback requirement in 
2011.160 These substantial setbacks were perceived to be de facto attempts to ban 
new fracked wells,161 but the legality of a ban on fracking became a focal point 
of State politics only after Denton—a North Texas city in the heart of the Barnett 
Shale play—enacted a ban on new wells through voter initiative.162 The state’s 
General Land Office and oil and gas industry members sued Denton, arguing the 
ban violated Texas law.163 But before the litigation had resolved the issue (or 
even produced a court opinion), the Texas legislature passed House Bill 40, 
which Governor Abbott signed into law.164 The law, which was co-authored and 
co-sponsored by Democrats as well as Republicans,165 largely shifted the 
balance of rights between operators and neighbors to the benefit of the operators. 
House Bill 40 is clear about one thing: it prohibits local bans on fracking. 
It also substantially restricts local fracking regulations. The law expressly limits 
municipalities’ ability to regulate surface activity of oil and gas operations, such 
as setbacks and light, noise, and traffic related to fracking operations, to local 
regulations that do not effectively prohibit any operations, are not otherwise 
preempted by state or federal law, and are “commercially reasonable.”166 The 
statute defines the key term “commercially reasonable” in a very industry-
friendly way: as “a condition that permits a reasonably prudent operator to fully, 
effectively, and economically exploit, develop, produce, process, and transport 
oil and gas.”167 While “commercially reasonable” obviously can be subject to 
 
J. ENVTL L. & POL’Y 41 (1996) (describing courts’ historic treatment of local regulation of fossil fuel extraction 
and mining). 
 159. See supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
 160. See Flower Mound, Tex. Ordinance No. 29-11 (July 18, 2011). 
 161. See, e.g., Steve Everley, “Setbacks” Really an Attempt to Ban Drilling, SAN ANTONIO REG. (Apr. 19, 
2015, 12:00 AM), https://www.mysanantonio.com/opinion/commentary/article/Setbacks-really-an-attempt-to-
ban-drilling-6207480.php. 
 162. Mose Buchele, After HB 40, What’s Next for Local Drilling Rules in Texas?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 
2, 2015, 8:58 AM), https://stateimpact.npr.org/texas/2015/07/02/after-hb-40-whats-next-for-local-drilling-bans-
in-texas/. 
 163. Plaintiff’s Original Petition and Application for Permanent Injunction, Patterson v. City of Denton, No. 
D-1-GN-14-004628, 2014 WL 5809895, at *1 (D. Tex. Nov. 5, 2014). 
 164. Tex. H.B. 40 § 2, 84th Leg. (Tex. 2015) (codified at TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 81.0523 (West 
2020)). 
 165. Id. 
 166. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 81.0523(a)(1). 
 167. Id. 
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different interpretations, as some municipal officials have emphasized,168 the 
statute’s definition seems to suggest that any regulation that significantly 
infringes upon the profitable operation of fracking operations will be legally 
vulnerable.  
While the law specifies property rights in favor of industry, it also specifies 
some locality rights.169 Such specified rights, however, leave out localities that 
have not yet enacted protective regulation and any new regulation meant to 
address new understanding of the risks from fracking. As a compromise to 
municipalities, H.B. 40 was amended prior to its passage to provide that any 
ordinances that have been in effect for at least five years and that have “allowed 
the oil and gas operations at issue to continue during that period” are to be 
“considered prima facie to be ‘commercially reasonable.’”170 This provision 
falls short of genuine grandfathering, as industry can still challenge pre-
enactment regulations and, notwithstanding the “prima facie” presumption, the 
same definition of commercially reasonable applies in challenges to pre-
enactment ordinances as to post-enactment ones. 
The Texas story deviates from the Demsetz theory in that the specification 
of property rights in the wake of conflict over intensified resource use did not 
compel the internalization of costs generated by the intensified resource use. 
House Bill 40, overall, had as its primary goal and anticipated effect limiting the 
extent to which fracking operators must internalize costs so as to reduce or 
eliminate the neighborhood quality externality associated with fracking. The 
statute thus seems to move the legal status quo in the opposite direction from 
that projected by Demsetz. 
The states’ varied responses to greater neighborhood amenity externalities 
show the messy factors that complicate a Demsetzian framework. Politics, 
courts, and residents’ experience with past oil and gas operations, among other 
factors, enhance or decrease the likelihood that greater property rights or 
institutional innovations will emerge in response to externalities. The water 
supply and water quality externalities show even more divergence from the 
Demsetz story due to similar factors, as we explore below. 
B. WATER SUPPLY AND QUALITY  
As discussed in Part I, the type of fracking now applied to shales around 
the United States uses large quantities of fresh water and generates waste that 
can, in turn, endanger the quality of fresh water. The water quantity externality, 
in particular, would seem to induce a classic Demsetzian response of enhanced 
definition of property rights with scarcity. Indeed, Demsetz used water as an 
example in his original work developing his theory, noting that a conversion of 
 
 168. See Melanie Kemp Okon & Susan E. Hannagan, HB 40: Impact on Municipal Regulation of Oil & Gas 
Operations, DALL. BAR ASS’N, Feb. 22, 2016 (suggesting that the bill will produce “extremely fact-intensive” 
litigation). 
 169. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 81.0523(c). 
 170. Id. at § 81.0523(a). 
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water rights from communal to private rights would benefit individual users, 
potentially encourage the internalization of more benefits and costs of water use, 
and reduce the costs of negotiating to lower the collective externalities of private 
resource use.171 And a substantial body of literature has applied the theory to 
water rights regimes, exploring the extent to which the development of water 
law comports with the Demsetz thesis or aspects of it.172  
The combination of concerns about water scarcity and the availability of a 
convenient alternative—reuse and recycling—would seem to trigger both water 
quantity and quality-related Demsetzian responses. We would project that 
particularly in dry states, where water resources are scarcer and traditional waste 
disposal outlets are also increasingly limited, governance would change to 
require reuse and recycling of produced water and flowback. But as we explore 
here, in Texas and Colorado—the more arid states, as compared to 
Pennsylvania—fracking and associated water scarcity has not led to greater 
definition of property rights in the resource or innovative tools to manage a 
largely communal resource. This may be, in part, because scarcity associated 
with fracking has in many cases not affected other human users of water but 
rather the species that depend on it—an externality that goes unnoticed by many. 
And, with respect to wastewater disposal and associated water quality concerns, 
operators in Texas, in particular, have simply sought out more convenient outlets 
for disposal rather than more closely defined and guarded property rights in 
existing disposal methods.173 In Pennsylvania, scarcity of oil and gas waste 
disposal options appears to have generated both enhanced definition of property 
rights through regulation and operator innovation in the form of wastewater 
recycling.174  
1. Pennsylvania 
As with the neighborhood amenity externality and water quantity, 
Pennsylvania’s response to greater risk to water quantity and quality as fracking 
expanded tracks the Demsetzian theory most closely of our three case study 
states.  
 
 171. Demsetz, supra note 1, at 356–57. 
 172. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Energy and Efficiency in the Realignment of Common-Law Water Rights, 19 
J. LEGAL STUD. 261, 262, 293–95 (1990); Henry E. Smith, Governing Water: The Semicommons of Fluid 
Property Rights, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 445, 452–56 (2008) (noting how water regimes depart in substantial ways 
from the theory). 
 173. See James Osborne, EPA Weighs Allowing Oil Companies to Pump Wastewater into Rivers, Streams, 
HOUS. CHRON. (Oct. 15, 2018, 2:02 PM), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/business/energy/article/EPA-
weighs-allowing-oil-companies-to-pump-13303676.php (seeking more lax surface water regulation). 
 174. See Pennsylvania Underground Injection Control (UIC) Permits, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
https://www.epa.gov/uic/pennsylvania-underground-injection-control-uic-permits (last visited Apr. 15, 2020) 
(showing that the EPA has recently issued more UIC permits in Pennsylvania). 
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a. Water Supply 
Pennsylvania has more abundant water supplies than Texas or Colorado, 
although it, too, experiences periods of drought.175 And the numerous surface 
and groundwater sources of water in the state also arguably make water quality 
concerns more intense. Streams and other waters that support important aquatic 
species abound, and some pollution incidents from fracking wastes, have raised 
alarm about impacts to aquatic habitats in the state.176 Further, the presence of 
numerous private drinking water wells, for which the quality of construction is 
not regulated by the state, heightens concerns about pollutants seeping into the 
wells and impacting water quality.177  
Pennsylvania has a complex water law regime because the state has both a 
riparian system in the west, which was largely unregulated until 2012, and a 
relatively strictly-regulated riparian system in the east.178 The eastern regulated 
portion provides a strong example of how governance and other commons 
management approaches can emerge to address increasing competition over a 
scarce common resource, whereas the west involves a more complex story.  
The eastern portion of Pennsylvania falls within the watersheds of the 
Delaware and Susquehanna Rivers, both of which are governed by somewhat 
unusual regional agencies that regulate on a watershed level.179 These agencies 
are unusual in at least two respects. First, they are formed by interstate compacts; 
after years of lawsuits among the states that share these rivers, Congress 
approved the Delaware River Basin Compact and Susquehanna River Basin 
Compact (SRBC) in which representatives from each state combined forces to 
form a regulatory body designed to manage water quality and quantity in ways 
that would avoid these types of legal disputes.180 Second, and relatedly, these 
bodies are unusual in that they govern based on ecological rather than 
geographic boundaries. Their jurisdiction expressly covers the rivers themselves 
and their surrounding “watersheds”—the land area over which precipitation and 
other water flows and eventually enters the large, central river (the Susquehanna 
or Delaware).  
The Susquehanna River Basin Commission, in particular, changed its rules 
to more clearly specify property rights as fracking boomed in the region. The 
 
 175. See, e.g., RICHENDERFER ET AL., supra note 36, at 47 (noting protections implemented by a regional 
water regulatory agency, including protections in Pennsylvania, during “drought emergencies”).  
 176. Cf. Tasker et al., supra note 41, at 7083–84 (describing experiments with compounds with chemical 
concentrations identical to fracking wastewater that killed aquatic life in water). 
 177. Recommendations for Construction of Private Water Wells in Bedrock, PA DEP’T ENVTL. 
CONSERVATION & NAT. RES., http://www.iconservepa.org/cs/groups/public/documents/document/ 
dcnr_006800.pdf. 
 178. See Craig P. Wilson, Water Resources, in Pennsylvania Bar Institute Resource Manual 189, 189 (2008) 
(noting that outside of the regulated areas in Pennsylvania, withdrawals or surface or groundwater are only 
“governed by common law”).  
 179. Id. 
 180. See New Jersey v. New York, 347 U.S. 995 (1954) (showing litigation among the basin states that 
preceded the compacts); About DRBC, DEL. RIVER BASIN COMM’N, https://www.state.nj.us/drbc/about/ (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2020). 
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Commission updated its rules to require individual permitting of water 
withdrawals for fracking and to reduce previous quantity-based thresholds that 
allowed some operators to avoid the permitting requirements.181 The 
Commission also actively enforced its existing passby flow requirement, which 
“is defined as a prescribed streamflow below which withdrawals must cease.”182 
In 2011 and 2012, during dry parts of the spring and summer, the Commission 
suspended water withdrawals—many of which were for fracturing—to protect 
local stream flows.183 These withdrawals would have caused streams to drop 
below the passby flow threshold if they continued.184 The Commission also 
worked to install more water quality monitors that provide remote, continuous, 
real-time data to be placed on a public website, and one member of the oil and 
gas industry contributed $750,000 to this effort, citing a desire for 
transparency.185 
In other parts of the state, where river basin commissions lack jurisdiction, 
larger water quantity externalities also triggered further definition of property 
rights. The western part of Pennsylvania previously contrasted sharply with the 
areas of the Commonwealth that fall within the Delaware and Susquehanna 
River watersheds. Outside of these watersheds, no regulations applied to water 
withdrawals; groundwater and surface water withdrawals, with the exception of 
surface water withdrawals by public water providers, were governed solely by 
the common law.186 Thus, operators withdrawing water for fracturing in the 
western third of Pennsylvania did not, until 2012, need any state authorization 
for water use and were “limited only by the rights of other riparians and their 
willingness to challenge the diversion as an unreasonable use damaging their 
riparian rights.”187 One doctrinal protection that helped to curb a potential free-
for-all use of the commons is the courts’ outright prohibition against riparian 
users’ transferring their rights or their water to entities who lack property rights 
 
 181. See, e.g., Jim Richenderfer, Water Acquisition for Unconventional Natural Gas Development Within 
the Susquehanna River Basin, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/richenderfer.pdf (noting a 
change to require approval by rule of consumptive uses of water for natural gas development, among other 
changes). 
 182. See, e.g., RICHENDERFER ET AL., supra note 36, at 44, 47 (noting that in individual approvals of water 
withdrawals for natural gas development, the commission included requirements for maintaining passby flows 
(stopping water use if the flow of the water source dipped below a certain point) and for “conservation release 
requirements,” which ensure a that a minimum quantity of water is maintained downstream of the water use). 
 183. 18 Water Withdrawals Remain on Hold to Protect Streams,  SUSQUEHANNA RIVER BASIN COMM’N 
(Aug. 11, 2011), http://paenvironmentdaily.blogspot.com/2011/08/srbc-18-water-withdrawals-remain-on.html; 
Press Release, Susquehanna River Basin Comm’n, 37 Water Withdrawals for Natural Gas Drilling and Other 
Uses Suspended to Protect Streams (June 28, 2012), https://www.srbc.net/about/news/news-release.html?id=89. 
 184. See sources supra note 183.  
 185. RICHENDERFER ET AL., supra note 36, at 55; David E. Hess, Susquehanna River Basin Commission 
Real-Time Water Quality Data Available No Online, PA ENVTL. DIG. (Mar. 8, 2010) 
http://www.paenvironmentdigest.com/newsletter/default.asp?NewsletterArticleID=15054.  
 186. Wilson, supra note 178, at 189. 
 187. Id. at 201.  
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in riparian lands.188 But, again, violations of this doctrine required motivated 
riparian users to raise case-by-case objections in court, and oil and gas operators 
drilling and fracturing wells on riparian lands could avoid this prohibition.  
As oil and gas operators withdrew water from numerous, diffuse small 
streams in many different communities,189 streams in this part of the state were 
overused—to the point of temporarily drying up entirely—as a result of 
fracturing operations.190 Pennsylvania policymakers and administrators stepped 
in to help remedy the situation. Specifically, pursuant to a statutory requirement 
issued in 2008,191 the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection 
(DEP) required oil and gas operators withdrawing water for drilling or fracturing 
to submit water management plans and obtain approval prior to withdrawing 
water.192 Similar to SRBC requirements, the DEP required that operators stop 
withdrawing water if the source dipped below a specific passby flow and 
required a “[p]lan for monitoring and reporting of water sources and uses,” 
including measurement of water withdrawals using “continuous-recording 
devices of flow meters.”193  
In 2013, voluntary industry standards also emerged to address both water 
use and water quality issues, demonstrating innovation beyond regulatory 
definition of property rights. Some oil and gas companies operating in 
Pennsylvania agreed to follow the voluntary measures encouraged by the Center 
for Responsible Shale Development, one of which is a commitment to recycle 
ninety percent of wastewater—using wastewater, rather than freshwater, to 
fracture new wells.194 This is likely in part because Pennsylvania environmental 
regulations, promulgated in response to the shale gas boom and concerns about 
water quality externalities, place strict requirements on the treatment of 
wastewater from fracturing.195 These rules encourage recycling as a potentially 
cheaper option, and operators therefore might have reached the ninety percent 
mark without this voluntary commitment. But they also might have made this 
commitment in an effort to better engage with local resource users and their 
environmental preferences for reducing water use and waste.  
 
 188. Michael Dillon, Water Scarcity and Hydraulic Fracturing in Pennsylvania: Examining Pennsylvania 
Water Law and Water Shortage Issues Presented by Natural Gas Operations in the Marcellus Shale, 84 
TEMP. L. REV. 201, 233 (2011) (noting that “a withdrawal made by a riparian gas company for use on 
nonriparian land would be per se unreasonable” under the court’s traditional rule).  
 189. See Austin L. Mitchell et al., Surface Water Withdrawals for Marcellus Shale Gas Development: 
Performance of Alternative Regulatory Approaches in the Upper Ohio River Basin, 47 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 
12669, 12670 (2013) (“[I]t is likely that more than 85% of the shale gas industry’s water use was taken directly 
or indirectly from surface waters).  
 190. Dillon, supra note 188, at 202.  
 191. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3211(m) (West 2012). 
 192. PA. DEPT. OF ENVTL. PROT., PENNSYLVANIA HYDRAULIC FRACTURING STATE REVIEW 1, 4 (2010), 
http://www.strongerinc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/PA-HF-Review-Print-Version.pdf (noting the 
introduction in 2008 of the required water management plan); 25 PA. CODE § 95.10(b) (2020). 
 193. 25 PA. CODE § 78a.69.  
 194. CTR. FOR RESP. SHALE DEV., PERFORMANCE STANDARDS (2013), 
http://www.responsibleshaledevelopment.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Performance-Standards-v.1.5.pdf. 
 195. 25 PA. CODE § 95.10(b).  
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b. Wastewater Disposal 
Reducing waste was of particular concern to Pennsylvania communities 
and the state government due to scarcity of disposal options; much of the 
property rights specification for the water quality externality in Pennsylvania 
therefore arose, as Demsetz might have predicted, out of necessity. The geology 
of the state is not conducive to the most common form of wastewater disposal—
underground injection control wells,196 although operators have sought to 
alleviate scarcity by requesting and obtaining several new injection permits.197 
And fracking operators’ initial preferred method of disposing of liquid wastes—
public sewage treatment plants—was shut down relatively quickly by the federal 
EPA.198 In the meantime, operators in Pennsylvania sought out alternative 
injection wells in other states, trucking many of their wastes to West Virginia 
and Ohio.199 The objective here was to find the cheapest, most convenient means 
of disposal that required the fewest possible changes to operations and allowed 
the same level as cost externalization that operators were accustomed to in the 
wastewater context. But, after Ohio experienced earthquakes determined to be 
triggered by injection wells, the state began to more heavily regulate the wells 
and placed a fee on sending waste to the wells.200 With few options at hand—
and with tightening Pennsylvania regulations—operators’ disposal options 
substantially narrowed. 
The state modified its regulations to require that fracking wastewater be 
treated prior to disposal and to mandate that operators develop a plan for how 
they would reduce the wastewater produced by the drilling and fracking 
operation.201 This, along with the limited availability of underground disposal 
wells, appears to have strongly encouraged wastewater reuse. By some 
estimates, ninety percent of fracking wastewater in Pennsylvania is reused 
because treatment and disposal of the water is expensive and relatively 
burdensome for well operators.202 But new injection wells are now being 
permitted in the state as opportunities for reuse and recycling narrow.203 
c. Surface Discharges and Well Casing Failures 
As fracking expanded, Pennsylvania also tightened its regulations designed 
to address spills of pollutants at the surface and potential casing issues. It 
 
 196. But see supra note 174 and accompanying text.  
 197. See Veil, supra note 49. 
 198. See Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the Oil and Gas Extraction Point Source 
Category, supra note 55 and accompanying text.  
 199. VEIL, supra note 57, at 41.   
 200. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.22(H)(1)(b) (West 2013) (placing a higher fee on waste generated 
outside of the jurisdiction of the Ohio Department of Natural Resources). 
 201. 25 PA. CODE § 95.10(b) (2020).  
 202. Carlos R. Romo, Hydraulic Fracturing, Uncooperative Federalism, and Technological Innovation, J. 
ENERGY & ENVTL. LAW, Winter 2014, at 1 (“According to some estimates, operators are currently recycling as 
much as 90% of wastewater in the state”). 
 203. See Veil, supra note 49. 
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required greater secondary containment around tanks and larger setbacks 
between fractured wells or well sites and nearby resources, such as streams and 
wetlands.204 The state also implemented a rebuttable presumption that water well 
contamination near well sites was caused by drilling or other operations. 
Operators deemed to have contaminated water wells under this standard had to 
fully replace the impacted water supply; the regulations therefore strongly 
incentivized operators to perform baseline testing of water quality prior to 
drilling and fracking so that they could rebut the presumption of 
contamination.205 These actions had the effect of cabining operators’ ability to 
externalize the costs of the drilling and fracturing process.  
Pennsylvania’s and regional water commissions’ actions in the areas of 
water quantity and quality—and, to a more limited degree, operators’ voluntary 
responses—show that this state hewed most closely to the Demsetz model in 
terms of tightening property rights definitions through governance and 
developing other innovative methods to respond to expanding externalities in 
these areas. 
2. Colorado  
Unlike in Pennsylvania, Colorado’s water law regime did not change 
substantially as fracking expanded within the state, and its laws addressing water 
quality changed only in moderate ways. In the water quantity context this is 
likely because the state—already highly familiar with water scarcity—had a 
detailed regulatory regime in place for water rights long before the fracking 
boom emerged.206  
a. Water Quantity 
The overall quantity of new water used for fracking in Colorado pales in 
comparison to other uses; in 2010 it comprised 0.08% of all demands for water 
in Colorado.207 But at a localized level, water scarcity associated with fracking 
has generated externalities.208 There simply is not enough water to go around in 
 
 204. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3215 (2012).  
 205. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3218 (2012).  
 206. See, e.g., William Fronczak, Designated Ground Water: Colorado’s Unique Way of Administering Its 
Underground Resources, 7 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 111, 111 (2003) (“As ground water within Colorado 
became increasingly exploited in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the State began taking a closer look at its ground 
water resources including the ways to manage them.”); Ryan Jarvis, Prior Appropriation and Water Quality: 
The Water Court’s Authority to Protect an Appropriator’s Right to Clean Water, 16 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 
295, 299 (2013) (noting the Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969 as “perhaps the most 
significant development” in Colorado water law). 
 207. Water Sources and Demand for Hydraulic Fracturing of Oil and Gas Wells in Colorado from 2010 
Through 2015, COLO. DIV. OF WATER RES., https://www.erieco.gov/DocumentCenter/View/2779/Oil-and-Gas-
Water-Sources-Fact-Sheet?bidId=.4 (last visited Apr. 15, 2020).  
 208. See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CASE STUDY ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACTS OF WATER 
ACQUISITION FOR HYDRAULIC FRACTURING ON LOCAL WATER AVAILABILITY 3 (2015), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-07/documents/hf_water_acquisition_report_final_6-3-
15_508_km.pdf (noting that in Colorado’s Piceance basin, for 16% of the days where there were withdrawals 
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some parts of the state. Despite the rise of localized scarcity issues, water rights 
in Colorado have not changed substantially with the expansion of water for 
fracking.209 The few exceptions include isolated court cases that have further 
defined and limited property rights in water. For example, prior to the slick water 
fracking boom in shales and tight sandstones in Colorado, the use of fracking to 
extract natural gas from coalbed methane formations in the state triggered a court 
decision making clear that the water that naturally comes up out of the coalbed—
produced water—is subject to the state’s water law regime.210 The lack of 
change is likely because of the existing, relatively stringent regulation of water 
in the state. 
For surface waters and the ground water that connects to them (“tributary 
waters”), Colorado has a complex, regulated prior appropriation water rights 
regime in which “first-in-time” users that diverted water for a beneficial use have 
priority rights to the water, and junior users may not negatively impact these 
senior users’ rights. The regime as it has evolved divides state waters into six 
categories. All surface waters are governed by a relatively traditional prior 
appropriation system administered by the Colorado Water Court. Because 
almost all surface waters are already over-appropriated, new diversions only 
realistically occur during the few times when there is excess streamflow and thus 
room for new users.211 Water markets in Colorado allow for transfers of existing 
use rights, but there are high transaction costs to these transfers, including 
difficulty identifying whether there are adequate supplies to be transferred and 
the need for a Water Court approval of the change in use.212 
The remaining five categories of water regimes cover groundwater. Some 
groundwater is within areas defined as “designated basins,” areas in which 
groundwater withdrawals are regulated by the Colorado Ground Water 
Commission and thirteen Ground Water Management Districts.213 Most wells in 
these basins do not include the use of water for oil and gas development as a 
recognized right, so an operator wanting to purchase water from a well has to 
get approval from the Water Commission for changing the use right.214 Next, 
there is Denver Basin groundwater, which does not count as a “designated” basin 
but is still specially regulated. Within this basin there is nontributary 
groundwater, which is not connected to surface water, and, confusingly, “not-
 
from a tributary to the Colorado River, cumulative daily withdrawals removed more than 40% of the available 
water). 
 209. See, e.g., COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1 (2014) (showing amendments to the law involving management 
of oil and gas waste but demonstrating that the regulatory provision allowing reuse and recycling wastewater 
already existed as of the 2014 amendments).  
 210. See Vance v. Wolfe, 205 P.3d 1165, 1173 (Colo. 2009). 
 211. See COLO. DIV. OF WATER RES., supra note 207. 
 212. Id.  
 213. What Are Designated Groundwater Basins?, MARTIN AND WOOD (Nov. 17, 2018), 
https://www.martinandwood.com/blog/what-are-designated-groundwater-basins; Fronczak, supra note 206, at 
115. 
 214. COLO. DIV. OF WATER RES., supra note 207, at 7. 
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nontributary water.”215 For both types of wells, which fall outside of the prior 
appropriation regime, there are few restrictions on the types of allowed water 
use, but no more than one percent of the water underlying the land may be 
withdrawn annually.216 Finally, for ground water outside of the designated 
basins and the Denver Basin, there is tributary and nontributary groundwater. 
Most tributary water—which falls within the prior appropriation legal system—
is connected to surface streams that are already over-appropriated.217 Operators 
wanting to use this water must complete detailed Augmentation Plans that 
describe how they will replace the water used.218 Nontributary waters outside of 
the Denver Basin also fall outside of the prior appropriation system and are 
primarily subject only to the restriction of using one percent of the water beneath 
the property on an annual basis.219  
This complex regime makes it very difficult for drilling and fracking 
companies to obtain new water rights or even purchase them from an existing 
user, since under many of these systems the operator must get approval for 
changing the beneficial use of water. The operators’ response has therefore 
largely been innovation by necessity. In the Piceance Basin, in the dry, western 
portion of the state, operators report one hundred percent recycling of flowback 
water.220 Although this recycled water does not cover all of their needs—they 
still obtain some water from streams and groundwater sources221—it is an 
impressive example of innovation. 
The response to increased water quality externalities in the state has been 
a more formal one, with the state forcing operators to internalize certain water 
quality externalities as fracking has grown. Most of this cost internalization has 
been through relatively traditional regulation and has not relied on other 
innovative management strategies, with the modest exception of water quality 
testing.  
b. Wastewater Disposal 
In the context of wastewater disposal, which can pollute surface water and 
groundwater and trigger earthquakes, Colorado’s approach has been less 
dynamic than Pennsylvania’s. Unlike Pennsylvania, the state does not require 
operators to treat wastewater before disposing of it, in part perhaps because 
Colorado has relatively abundant UIC well space. Thus, the easiest, most 
common method of disposing of wastes does not present major scarcity issues 
for operators in Colorado, potentially disincentivizing the more aggressive 
actions taken by Pennsylvania—a state with very few UIC wells. 
 
 215. Id.  
 216. Id.; see also COLO REV. STAT. § 37-90-102 (2017) (essentially treating both types of water in the 
Denver Basin identically).  
 217. COLO. DIV. OF WATER RES., supra note 207, at 7. 
 218. Id.  
 219. Id. 
 220. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 208, at 3. 
 221. Id.  
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 To address potential earthquakes from UIC wells, the state conducts a 
review prior to approving an injection well to identify historic seismic events 
and other conditions that might suggest the well could trigger an earthquake.222 
But in a somewhat more innovative move, the state is working with scientists at 
several universities, as well as the EPA and a consortium of other states, to better 
understand the causes of induced seismicity.223 As with Texas, however, the 
state has not taken relatively comprehensive substantive regulatory steps to 
lessen the risks of earthquakes. The state has been somewhat more responsive 
in terms of preventing and addressing potential spills of chemicals, waste, and 
other substances at the surface and the threat of underground contamination of 
water, as discussed next.  
c. Surface Discharges and Well Casing Failures 
With respect to potential spills of fracking chemicals and other wastes at 
the surface, Colorado narrowed previously loosely-defined property rights in 
fracking by adding relatively detailed distance-based limits fracking near public 
water sources. Specifically, as fracking began to increase in Colorado, the state 
issued new regulations drawing three buffer zones around public water supplies. 
In the zone closest to the water supply, very few oil and gas activities could 
occur. In the next zone, more activities were allowed, provided that adequate 
pollution-preventing measures were followed, and somewhat more activities 
were permitted in the farther buffer.224 However, Colorado did not go nearly as 
far as Pennsylvania in terms of more formally delineating property rights. The 
state did not establish new requirements for locating fracked wells farther from 
streams and other resources at the surface, for example. An attempted citizen 
amendment in 2018 would have mandated some of these setbacks, but it 
narrowly failed.225 
To address concerns about potential water contamination from drilling and 
fracking, in 2013 Colorado revised its policy to require that any oil and gas 
operators drilling a horizontal well identify and report all existing oil and gas 
wells within 1500 feet of the proposed horizontal well.226 This allows the state 
to pinpoint any wells that have inadequate casing and that could provide a 
conduit for leaking pollutants. If any existing wells are shown to have casing 
 
 222. Engineering Unit Seismicity Review for Class II Underground Injection Control Wells, COLO. OIL & 
GAS CONSERVATION COMM’N https://cogcc.state.co.us/documents/about/TF_Summaries/ 
GovTaskForceSummary_Sesimicity_Review_for_Class_II_Underground_Injection_Control_Wells.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2020). 
 223. Id. 
 224. COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:317B (2014) (showing regulations promulgated in 2007). 
 225. John Aguilar, Prop 112 Fails as Voters Say No to Larger Setbacks for Oil and Gas, DENVER POST, 
https://www.denverpost.com/2018/11/06/colorado-proposition-112-results/ (last updated Nov. 8, 2018, 8:52 
AM). 
 226. STATE REV. OF OIL AND NAT. GAS ENVTL. REGULATIONS, A REPORT AND SUMMARY OF OUTCOMES 
FROM 2010–2012 HYDRAULIC FRACTURING STATE REVIEWS 9, https://www.strongerinc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/10/A-Report-and-Summary-of-Outcomes-from-2010-2012-Hydraulic-Fracturing-State-
Reviews.pdf. 
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problems, the operator must take remedial measures before it can frack the 
well.227 The state also later revised its regulations to require all oil and gas 
operators to test the quality of water in four water wells near proposed fracking 
sites.228 This established baseline data about existing pollution, which, in turn, 
allowed better identification of new pollutants that might have entered water as 
a result of drilling and fracking. Although this does not directly force operator 
internalization of costs, it supports other innovative governance measures such 
as community monitoring of water quality. It also eases the path to court for 
landowners concerned about contaminated groundwater. By providing baseline 
data on water quality, it allows plaintiffs to better demonstrate that new 
pollutants entered the water supply after drilling and fracking if contamination 
did, in fact, occur. 
Aside from the requirement that oil and gas operators repair old leaky wells 
near well sites prior to fracking, Colorado took few formal substantive measures 
to force operator internalization of externalities. Unlike Texas, the state did not 
change its casing requirements for fracked wells to ensure that pressures placed 
on the well would not compromise casing. A panel of experts that reviewed 
Colorado’s regulations recommended that the state consider certain changes to 
its casing requirements—including requiring that casing reach a certain depth 
below groundwater—but the state reviewed existing wells, determined that none 
had had casing problems, and concluded that revised regulations were therefore 
not necessary.229 
3. Texas 
Texas—which, like Colorado, has historic experience with water 
scarcity—did not substantially modify property rights in water in response to the 
fracking boom. Nor did it require practices such as wastewater recycling, which 
both reduces the need for freshwater supplies and addresses wastewater disposal 
and associated water quality concerns.230 The explanation to this general lack of 
a Demsetzian response once again lies largely in politics. Unlike Colorado, 
Texas did not have an existing, detailed regime to regulate water used for 
fracking when fracking expanded in several of the state’s shale plays. However, 
the state did make some meaningful changes to address water quality concerns, 
including encouraging operator innovation in wastewater reuse by changing 
liability in this area and updating certain regulations to force certain 
internalization of potential pollution externalities. 
 
 227. Id.  
 228. COLO. CODE REGS. § 609 (2020). 
 229. STATE REV. OF OIL AND NAT. GAS ENVTL. REGULATIONS, supra note 226, at 9. 
 230. The state did, however, incentivize recycling by changing liability and tax laws relating to the 
wastewater. See infra notes 258–259 and accompanying text.  
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a. Water Quantity  
As described in Part I, fracking requires a great deal of freshwater.231 The 
water sources for fracking in Texas differ amongst the various shale plays within 
state boundaries. For example, surface water and groundwater provide 
approximately equal amounts of water for fracking in the Barnett Shale play in 
North Texas.232 Meanwhile, groundwater provides virtually all of the freshwater 
supply in the Permian Basin area shale play at the eastern edge of Texas and the 
Eagle Ford shale play in South Texas.233 While localized surface water depletion 
from fracking in Texas is possible,234 fracking’s primary risk to water supply is 
to Texas’s underground aquifers: it is with respect to groundwater that the 
depletion externality is greatest and where Demsetz’s theory would suggest a 
greater specification of rights encouraging cost internalization as a response to 
fracking. But, in fact, for reasons related to the configuration of its pre-fracking 
boom legal institutions, doctrines, culture, and the current political might of the 
oil and gas industry in Texas, we do not see any greater specification of rights 
or any move to encourage cost internalization. 
Both in the near-term and as a long-term matter, fracking would seem to 
pose a greater risk to freshwater supply in Texas than in either Colorado or 
Pennsylvania. The Trinity aquifer, “the primary source of groundwater for 
energy development in the Barnett Shale, and a major municipal water source,” 
is already in a state of “depletion.”235 Fracking’s draw on this already-depleted 
resource is bound to increase. The water supply issues are even more 
pronounced in the shale plays in southern and western Texas. According to an 
EPA report, the potential for water quantity and quality impacts due to hydraulic 
fracturing acquisition appears to be higher in southern and western Texas than 
in any other of the areas of fracking in the United States.236 The Permian Basin 
bordering New Mexico, in particular, is an arid area of “extremely high water 
stress.”237 Fracking operators in this already water-scarce region use more water 
 
 231. See supra notes 31–35 and accompanying text. 
 232. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 26, at 4-6 tbl. 4-1. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Surface water, which provides the bulk of water used by municipalities and industry in Texas, is 
governed by a regulated prior appropriation system, with the relevant surface waters fully or over-appropriated. 
Id. at 4–38. To withdraw from a surface water, therefore, a fracking operator would need to obtain a state permit 
for a specified amount of water, and any rights granted by the permit would be junior to, or limited by, prior 
appropriators of the surface water at issue. Id. Alternatively, fracking operators could only feasibly acquire 
appropriated water by purchasing it from currently water rights holders, the most likely of which would be 
municipalities that hold excess or unneeded water rights. Id. at 4–23. But, reportedly, fracking operators in Texas 
mostly have used surface water via new direct withdrawals rather than market purchase. Id. at 4–35. 
 235. Charles F. Mason et al., The Economics of Shale Gas Development 16 (Resources for the Future, 
Discussion Paper No. 14-42, 2015); U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 26, at 4–30 (explaining that 
in the Barnett and Haynesville plays, as groundwater demands increase, there is “potential for localized aquifer 
drawdown” and that “[g]roundwater quality degradation associated with aquifer drawdown” has been 
documented in aquifers “overlying much of the Barnett play”). 
 236. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 26, at 4–24. 
 237. Id. (noting that 87% of the wells in the Permian basin “are in areas of extremely high water stress”). 
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per fractured well than do operators in the five other major shale plays.238 The 
Ogallala Aquifer, which lies below much of the Permian basin, “has limited 
recharge because of the area’s lower rainfall and the clay soils that impede water 
percolation there.”239 
The doctrine of capture largely defined rights to groundwater in Texas 
before the fracking boom, and still largely defines such rights. Under the capture 
doctrine, the owner of the surface land may withdraw—that is, capture—as 
much groundwater as is physically possible to withdraw.240 Once withdrawn, the 
surface owner has close-to-absolute rights to the water. The owner can use the 
water on land he owns or transfer it to others; there is no limitation on what the 
water is used for or where it is used.241 The owner need not withdraw, transport, 
or use the water in a way that is resource-efficient (for example, by minimizing 
spills or evaporation).242 Perhaps most notably, capture of groundwater is 
entirely lawful even if the surface owner’s drilling for water has the effect of 
depleting water deposits under land owned by others, as can easily occur as 
underground water supplies invariably cross land boundaries.243 
Because of the absolutist nature of capture doctrine, courts have almost no 
opportunity within the contours of the doctrine to reduce the risk that fracking 
operators will withdraw so much groundwater that the near- or long-term ability 
of other users to access needed water is threatened. Thus, in a pure capture 
regime, one can imagine a situation in which fracking operations deplete both 
the oil and gas resources and the groundwater in an area and then close down, 
such that the economy no longer benefits from fracking, and other water-
dependent uses become infeasible.244 
Nor does there appear to be a possibility that the Texas courts will simply 
hold that capture is no longer a valid legal rule. If a locality or neighbor sued 
 
 238. Kondash et al., supra note 32, at 4. 
 239. Aquifers, TEX. A&M U.: TEX. WATER, https://texaswater.tamu.edu/groundwater/aquifers.html (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2020). 
 240. For a description of how the Texas doctrine of capture for groundwater originated, its perverse effects, 
and its durability despite criticism, see Zachary Bray, Texas Groundwater and Tragically Stable “Crossovers,” 
2014 BYU L. REV. 1283. 
 241. See id. at 1311–14. 
 242. See id. at 1320. 
 243. See Margaret A. Cook et al., Who Regulates It? Water Policy and Hydraulic Fracturing in Texas, 6 
TEX. WATER J. 45, 50 (2015) (explaining that Texas’ capture regime allows unlimited withdrawals “even if 
[the] . . . withdrawal[s] will inhibit access to water by neighboring landowners”). For example, in City of Corpus 
Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 276 S.W.2d 798 (1955), the Texas Supreme Court upheld a withdrawal of water 
under the doctrine of capture even though ten million gallons of groundwater was lost per day to evaporation 
and seepage during transport. In Pecos City. Water Control & Improvement Dist. v. Williams, 271 S.W.2d 503 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1954), the court allowed irrigators to over pump the aquifer and dry up nearby springs that 
contributed to surface water flow. 
 244. The Texas capture regime, in the context of fracking, thus presents a close analogy to Demsetz’s 
overgrazing example, with the important difference that oil and gas, unlike grazing land, is a depletable resource, 
so industry rationally may take a short-term perspective. Cf. David A. Dana & Hannah J. Wiseman, A Market 
Approach to Regulating the Energy Revolution: Assurance Bonds, Insurance, and the Certain and Uncertain 
Risks of Hydraulic Fracturing, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1523 (2014) (explaining why fracking operators do not take a 
long-term view with respect to environmental damage from fracking).  
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fracking operators for capturing “too much” water, a lower court in Texas (or a 
federal court, applying Texas law) could do nothing. This is because the Texas 
Supreme Court in Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of America,245 while seeming 
to acknowledge the irrationalities of capture as a rule for allocating water rights, 
refused to abandon it, resting its decision to do so on tradition, settled 
expectations, and the court’s view of the superiority of the legislature as the 
institutional nexus for legal reform.246  
Since 1949, Texas has had a state statute authorizing the creation of 
groundwater conservation districts.247 In Sipriano, the Texas Supreme Court 
suggested that the Texas legislature could further empower groundwater 
conservation districts and, should they choose, could modify the absolutist 
common law the rule of capture law with regulations without incurring liability 
for a taking.248 But the Texas legislature has not enacted a groundwater law post-
Sipriano, and groundwater conservation districts, as currently constituted, are 
not well-positioned to address the water supply externality posed by fracking. 
For one thing, some areas of Texas with fracking activity simply have no 
conservation district in place.249 Second, where they have been established, 
groundwater conservation districts generally correspond to the borders of a 
county, which do not generally match the boundaries of water resources. And 
there is a notable lack of consistency and coordination among district regulations 
within the shale plays in Texas.250 Third, under Texas law, districts have very 
little funding flexibility and generally very little funding at all; districts can levy 
taxes only by means of special elections in which they seek voter approval for 
specific financial outlays.251 As a result, the districts are not well-positioned to 
take on costly political or litigation battles with the extremely well-resourced oil 
and gas industry.252 
On top of all this, Texas state law arguably is designed to prevent districts 
from doing anything with respect to water withdrawals for fracking. Texas’ 
water code was written before fracking, and while it permits groundwater 
conservation districts to develop a permit program for “drilling, equipping, 
 
 245. 1 S.W.3d 75 (Tex. 1999). 
 246. Id. at 80–81. 
 247. See Groundwater Conservation Districts, TEX. A&M U.: TEX. WATER, https://texaswater.tamu.edu/ 
groundwater/groundwater-conservation-districts.html (tracing history of districts). 
 248. Sipriano, 1 S.W.3d at 79. 
 249. Cook et al., supra note 243, at 50.  
 250. Id. at 60. As a general matter, the fact that any given district only includes a portion of the relevant 
underground aquifer creates a disincentive for districts to engage in conservation regulation, as a district’s water 
supply will not necessarily stabilized by its own restrictions on in-district water withdrawals, and, by the same 
token, a district can externalize the costs of withdrawals to out-of-district (or as we shall see, out-of-state) water 
users. 
 251. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.201 (West 2020). 
 252. See, e.g., Carlos Morales, West Texas Ground Water Districts Scramble to Keep Up with Industry, 
MARFA PUB. RADIO (Aug. 21, 2017), http://marfapublicradio.org/blog/west-texas-groundwater-districts-
scramble-to-keep-up-with-industry/ (explaining that with very small budgets, ground water districts cannot keep 
pace with the oil and gas industry). 
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operating, or completing” wells, it exempts oil and gas exploration wells from 
permit requirements.253 Although some districts do not construe the exemption 
to cover water wells drilled to service fracking, even these districts reportedly 
have been hesitant to litigate the issue and have settled when faced with litigation 
threats.254 Groundwater districts have urged the Texas legislature to clarify the 
scope of the statutory exemption, and various bills have been introduced. But 
none have come close to passing.255 
One alternative to direct regulation of water withdrawals for fracking is to 
regulate methods of disposing of fracking wastewater—thus incentivizing reuse 
or recycling of the water in other wells—or to directly require recycling or reuse. 
But Texas, unlike Pennsylvania, does not require wastewater reduction plans or 
treatment of most wastewater prior to disposal, as discussed below.256 And 
underground injection wells in Texas are abundant; they offer the cheapest 
option for wastewater management despite freshwater for fracking being 
relatively scarce.257 Texas only encourages wastewater recycling through a law 
that reduces operator liability for any pollution caused by the wastewater after it 
leaves the well site for treatment,258 and through tax exemptions for equipment 
used in recycling.259 Groundwater conservation districts cannot discourage 
water withdrawals by restricting the drilling and use of injections wells for 
wastewater disposal, because the districts lack jurisdiction over disposal 
wells.260 
Another problem with the regulatory regime for groundwater in Texas is 
that some underground water resources cross state borders—most notably the 
Texas-New Mexico border—and there is no institutional apparatus to address 
cross-boundary concerns. Fracking recently boomed on both sides of the Texas-
 
 253. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.117(b)(2). 
 254. See Bray, supra note 240, at 1343; Tiffany Dowell Lashmet & Amber Miller, Texas Exempt Wells: 
Where Does Fracking Fit?, 55 NAT. RES. J. 239, 253–256 (2015). 
 255. See, e.g., Stacey A. Steinbach, Legislative Wrap-Up: 83rd Legislative Session, TEX. ALLIANCE OF 
GROUNDWATER DISTRICTS, http://www.texasgroundwater.org/pdfs/130730TAGDLegSumWeb.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2020) (discussing the failure of S.B. 873, which would have clarified the scope of authority of 
groundwater districts). The powerful Texas Oil and Gas Association has opposed any statutory efforts to clearly 
vest permitting authority in groundwater conservation districts. See Lashmet & Miller, supra note 254, at 255–
56. 
 256. See infra Subpart II.B.3.b.  
 257. Jackie Benton, Recycling Fracking Water, COMPTROLLER.TEXAS.GOV.: FISCAL NOTES, 
https://comptroller.texas.gov/economy/fiscal-notes/2015/october/fracking.php (last visited Apr. 15, 2020). 
 258. H.B. 2767, 83rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2013). The recycler, rather than the generator of the wastewater, 
legally owns the water under this law. Id. The bill also limits the liability of recyclers after they have transferred 
the water to another operator for use in a well. Id. 
 259. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.355 (West 2020); see also Alex Brakefield, Produced Water Management: 
A Comparative Study, TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. BLOG (Oct. 30, 2016), http://tjogel.org/produced-water-
management-a-comparative-study/ (describing Texas’s regulatory approach to produced water management and 
comparing it to Pennsylvania’s).  
 260. Indeed, groundwater conservation districts may not even require fracking operators to notify them of 
the drilling of new disposal wells. Jim Malewitz, Groundwater Districts Seek Help Tracking Disposal Wells, 
TEX. TRIB. (July 29, 2015, 6:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2015/07/29/groundwater-officials-seek-
help-tracking-disposal-/. 
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New Mexico border, with water captured on the Texas side of the border 
providing some of the water used for fracking in New Mexico—where there is 
strict regulation of groundwater withdrawal. According to New Mexico 
officials, Texans are sucking up water that otherwise would lie underneath New 
Mexico and then are transporting it for profit to New Mexico, frustrating New 
Mexico’s efforts to address depletion risk.261 The absence of meaningful 
groundwater withdrawal regulation in Texas thus spills over to New Mexico. 
While state-based water regulation is almost never sensitive to out-of-state 
effects,262 Texas also seems to have not dealt with depletion risks to Texas from 
water withdrawals from fracking. Legal responses to the risk of depletion in 
Texas have been, in some of the areas most at risk, basically nonexistent, 
although from a Demsetzian perspective Texas is perhaps the state where we 
would most anticipate property rights specification and cost internalization 
regarding water supply would result from the added resource demand associated 
with fracking.  
b. Wastewater Disposal  
Texas has experienced a massive increase in wastewater production along 
with oil and gas output.263 As production has expanded, the options for disposing 
of the wastewater from drilling and fracking have narrowed, and concerns about 
spills of wastewater, fracking chemicals, and other substances at and near well 
sites have increased. Furthermore, attention to the possibility of groundwater 
contamination during and after fracking, and from wastewater disposal, has 
increased. Indeed, during a fifteen-year study period, officials in Texas noted 
211 groundwater contamination incidents associated with oil and gas 
production. Approximately thirty-five percent of these were caused by waste 
management and disposal issues, and approximately twenty-six percent resulted 
from discharges during oil and gas production.264  
Enhanced attention to the water quality externality would, from a 
Demsetzian perspective, suggest that institutional changes would emerge in the 
form of regulation that required industry to eliminate or otherwise internalize 
some negative water quality externalities. Additionally, or alternatively, 
 
 261. See, e.g., Jay Root, New Mexico Official Says Texas Landowners are “Stealing” Millions of Gallons 
of Water and Selling It Back for Fracking, TEX. TRIB. (June 7, 2018, 12:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/ 
2018/06/07/texas-landowners-new-mexico-stealing-water-fracking/. 
 262. In fact, Texas has been litigating for years its claim that New Mexico is appropriating part of Texas’s 
rightful share or the water from the Rio Grande River. Emma Platoff, Federal Government May Fight Alongside 
Texas in Water Dispute, U.S. Supreme Court Rules, TEX. TRIB., https://www.texastribune.org/2018/03/05/ 
federal-government-may-fight-texas-water-dispute-us-supreme-court-rule/ (last updated Mar. 5, 2018, 5:00 
PM). 
 263. See, e.g., Nicot et al., supra note 32, at 2469 (noting a five-fold increase in wastewater injection 
volumes over an approximate ten-year period in fifteen counties in Texas). 
 264. Scott Kell, State Oil and Gas Agency Groundwater Investigations and Their Role in Advancing 
Regulatory Reforms: A Two-State Review: Ohio and Texas, GROUNDWATER PROT. COUNCIL (2011), 
http://fracfocus.org/sites/default/files/publications/state_oil__gas_agency_groundwater_investigations_optimiz
ed.pdf. 
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innovative governance might at least encourage this cost internalization. As with 
water scarcity in Texas, however, there has been only limited movement toward 
forcing industry to bear more of the costs of pollution. There has been some 
regulatory response to encourage but not require innovation, as we discuss in 
this part. Overall, rather than enhancing property rights to resolve disputes 
surrounding existing disposal options, drillers have sought to decrease scarcity 
in alternative disposal outlets. Specifically, they have pushed to loosen 
regulations that limit disposal of oil and gas wastewater into surface waters—an 
approach that would have fewer transaction costs and direct costs for operators, 
although potentially more environmental externalities, if successful.  
Operators’ disposal options in Texas vary in terms of their expense and 
accessibility. In the eastern United States (east of the 98th meridian, which 
includes the eastern portion of Texas), federal Clean Water Act regulations 
prohibit discharging liquid oil and gas wastes into surface waters.265 A separate 
Clean Water Act regulation allows limited discharge of produced water west of 
the 98th meridian, provided the water is discharged into surface waters that will 
be beneficially used for agriculture or wildlife.266 This distinction exists because 
when the EPA initially drafted the regulations it modified them in response to 
comments from western states requesting that the regulations allow for 
beneficial reuse of water. Few operators have used this discharge option, 
however, because treatment is relatively expensive.267  
Another wastewater disposal outlet, reuse and recycling, can also be 
expensive, particularly if there are no nearby wells to be fracked. In Texas, as 
the boom in drilling and fracking produced large quantities of wastewater and 
increased UIC use, resistance to the use of UIC wells emerged but ultimately did 
little to slow the practice. One suit by citizens alleged that the state agency 
permitting UIC wells should, as a result of its enabling state statute, have to 
consider a variety of environmental and social impacts beyond potential 
underground water contamination, such as road damage and increased truck 
traffic, when issuing permits for UIC wells.268 This suit ultimately failed because 
the court did not interpret the statute’s requirement that the agency consider 
whether the well was “in the public interest” to include considerations of surface 
impacts such as traffic safety concerns.269 And the pollution of Midland’s 
drinking water source with a plume of salty water from a failed UIC well—
pollution that the bankrupt UIC operator could not pay to clean up270—generally 
 
 265. 40 C.F.R. § 435.52 (2020). 
 266. 40 C.F.R. §§ 435.50, 435.52.  
 267. Osborne, supra note 173. 
 268. R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Tex. Citizens for a Safe Future & Clean Water, 336 S.W.3d 619, 622 (Tex. 
2011). 
 269. Id. at 632. 
 270. City of Midland’s Motion for Estimation of Claims for Purposes of Allowance, Voting, and 
Determining Plan Feasibility, and Request for Determination that Remediation Claim is Entitled to Admin. 
Expense Priority at 26, In re Heritage Consolidated, LLC, Nos. 10-36484-HDH-11, 2012 WL 1123145 (Bankr. 
N.D. Tex. 2012). 
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raised surprisingly few alarm bells about UIC wells. Texas, did, however, 
intervene in the suit and seek contributions for the billions of dollars in damage 
caused.271 Further, Texas agencies responded relatively slowly to the news that 
UIC wells were triggering earthquakes, including earthquakes near a major 
airport in Dallas.272 The state did ultimately issue revised regulations to address 
the earthquake risk,273 but these were minor—primarily requiring information 
disclosure—compared to new regulations in states like Ohio.274 
Although there has not been movement to better define property rights 
through regulation in the UIC context, UIC scarcity has forced an industry 
response. Particularly with the most recent Wolf Camp Shale boom, UIC space 
for waste from fracked wells is increasingly scarce. Industry has responded, in 
part, by seeking alternative, more abundant space for disposal. Operators have 
supported a Trump Administration EPA move to reconsider existing regulatory 
restrictions on discharging treated liquid oil and gas wastes directly into surface 
waters.275 These regulations would apply throughout the United States, and thus 
would benefit operators in Texas and elsewhere. But they would be particularly 
beneficial in Texas given the increasing scarcity of UIC space. In seeking to 
modify these regulations, operators are, it appears, seeking to skirt what might 
otherwise be a predictable Demsetzian response: with less UIC space, the state 
might tighten up UIC requirements or force operators to use alternative disposal 
methods, thus making operators internalize the rising costs of disposal. Instead, 
operators are seeking to continue to externalize costs by finding an easy disposal 
pathway with few restrictions—one that would allow them to dump waste into 
rivers and streams without requiring them to first apply rigorous treatment that 
would remove pollutants.  
Requiring recycling and reuse of wastewater rather than the use of UIC 
wells or surface water disposal would be one alternative to this cost 
externalization by operators. Here, the state has not forced industry to internalize 
environmental costs of disposal because it has not required recycling, unlike 
Pennsylvania, which essentially has. But some innovative governance has 
emerged. As introduced earlier, the Texas Legislature has made recycling of 
wastes easier by reducing operator liability for the waste.276 Specifically, after 
an operator transfers liquid oil and gas wastes to a facility for treatment or 
another well, the wastes become the property of the entity in possession of 
 
 271. Id.; Response of the Tex. R.R. Comm’n to the City if Midland’s Motion for Estimation of Claims at 2, 
Heritage, 2012 WL 1123145 (agreeing largely with Midland but noting other potential remediation needs, 
among other differences).  
 272. Frohlich et al., supra note 53, at 327. Texas promulgated regulations to address induce seismicity that 
did not take effect until 2014. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.9, 3.46 (2020).  
 273. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.9 (requiring information on historic seismic events around areas proposed 
for UIC wells and allowing the Railroad Commission, which approves UIC wells, to require more data). 
 274. OHIO ADMIN. CODE 1501:9-3-07 (2020) (requiring continuous monitoring of injection well pressures 
and well shut-down if pressures exceed a certain amount).  
 275. Osborne, supra note 173. 
 276. See supra notes 258–259 and accompanying text.  
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them.277 And liability for anyone possessing the wastewater is capped.278 In 
2006, as the number of Barnett Shale fracked wells continued to increase, the 
state also created specific regulations for commercial facilities that recycle 
wastes from wells, requiring a permit for transporting waste and operating a 
recycling facility and data to show that the facility will not contribute to water 
contamination, among other externalities.279  
As with water use, Texas—the state in which operators generate the most 
oil and gas wastewater280—has again responded to scarcity of wastewater 
disposal space in ways that do not fit within the traditional Demsetzian 
framework. The search for environmental resources that offer more abundant 
disposal options, however, is predictable. If the EPA were to relax current 
restrictions on the disposal of oil and gas wastes into rivers and streams, this 
would move surface waters closer to the status of an open access commons. This, 
too, of course, could perhaps trigger a Demsetzian response as competition for 
this newly accessible resource tightened. But for now, seeking laxer 
environmental regulation appears to be operators’ preferred course of action. 
c. Surface Discharges and Well Casing Failures  
Just as water quality risks posed by wastewater disposal have not generated 
much of a response toward cost internalization by industry, other water quality 
externalities—groundwater pollution from spills of substances on the surface 
and faulty casing that leaks—have not in most cases led Texas to promulgate 
more stringent regulation.  
Unlike Pennsylvania, which increased required setbacks of wells from 
natural resources (in part to prevent spills from reaching those resources),281 
among other requirements, Texas did not revise its regulations to address 
potential surface discharges. Colorado and Pennsylvania enhanced reporting 
requirements for spills and discharges, requiring mandatory disclosure of these 
incidents by operators, whereas Texas has not followed suit.282 As with the lack 
of permits for fracking water withdrawals in Texas, difficult-to-access 
information about spills and discharges means the public might be less aware of 
the water quality externalities of fracking, and thus might have more difficulty 
supporting political arguments to enhance regulation.  
With respect to the potential for well casing to fail, allowing substances to 
be released underground, the fracturing boom did trigger regulatory change in 
Texas. In 2013, the state’s oil and gas regulatory agency adopted new casing 
 
 277. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 122.002 (West 2020). 
 278. Id. at § 122.003. 
 279. Kell, supra note 264, at 81.  
 280. VEIL, supra note 57, at 37.  
 281. Act No. 13 of 2012, H.B. 3048, Gen. Assemb., 2011 Sess. (Pa. 2011) (codified as amended at 58 PA. 
CONS. STAT. § 3215(b)(4) (2020)).  
 282. Lauren A. Patterson et al., Unconventional Oil and Gas Spills: Risks, Mitigation Priorities, and State 
Reporting Requirements, 51 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 2563, 2565 (2017). 
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regulations designed to ensure that increased pressure placed on the casing by 
fracking would not contribute to casing failure.283 
In sum, the case of fracking’s water supply and quality externality in Texas 
suggests that path dependence coupled with current political realities can 
overwhelm the logic of Demsetz’s theory. Texas is, in parts, a very dry state with 
over-taxed groundwater resources. The additional and—on a localized level—
great water demand attributable to fracking operators has commanded attention 
and calls of alarm, but not enough to override the weight of history and current 
political realities discussed in Part III. 
III.  DEMSETZ, PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND GOVERNANCE: UNDERSTANDING 
MIXED RESPONSES TO GREATER EXTERNALITIES 
Fracking would seem to present the classic Demsetz case. A vast resource 
long assumed to be relatively useless suddenly becomes highly sought-after and 
valuable. Specifically, shales and similar formations contained vast reserves of 
oil and gas long assumed to be inaccessible. But the development of the slick 
water fracking technique, combined with horizontal drilling, represented a 
technological breakthrough that opened up access to the resource and made it 
incredibly valuable. As oil and gas companies scrambled to extract the oil and 
gas, externalities increased and became much more visible, and the gains from 
developing a regime that specifies rights and addresses externalities should have 
come to outweigh the transaction costs of developing such a regime. But Part II 
demonstrates that responses to the fracking boom in different parts of the United 
States were in fact highly divergent, and often loosely tracked the modified 
Demsetz theory, if at all.  
The differences in the legal treatment of fracking among the states do not 
seem to be obviously related to differences in geology, hydrology, economics, 
or even demographics. Instead, the differences in legal treatment seem to be due 
to variations among the states’ pre-fracking-boom legal institutions, politics, and 
court culture. We begin this Part by describing the several ways in which the 
state case studies in Part II do not comfortably fit with the Demsetz theory and 
then flesh out political, legal institutional, and other factors that explain this 
conundrum. 
A. THE DEMSETZ CONUNDRUM 
Fracking in populated areas raised the question of the relative rights of 
fracking operators to maximize revenue from the oil and gas resource and the 
rights of neighbors, as represented by local governments, to protect their 
neighborhood quality from fracking’s externalities. As the Demsetz framework 
would suggest, the fracking-neighborhood conflict did result in a new 
 
 283. Summary of Amendments to Statewide Rule 13, RAILROAD COMM’N OF TEX. (May 24, 2013), 
http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/oil-gas/compliance-enforcement/rule-13-geologic-formation-info/summary-of-
amendments-to-swr-13/; 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.13(a)(7) (2020). 
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specification of frackers’ and neighbors’ relative rights in Pennsylvania, 
Colorado, and Texas. In none of the states did the law simply remain unaffected 
by fracking. Some of the differences among the states are not necessarily 
inconsistent with Demsetz. The actors and institutions driving the specification 
of rights differ from state to state; in the neighborhood quality context contracts 
between fracking entities and localities in Colorado have assumed a large role; 
in Pennsylvania, the state supreme court’s interpretation of the state constitution 
has been key; and in Texas, it is the state legislature that so far that has specified 
the rights of fracking entities vis-a-vis localities. Moreover, although all the 
post-boom specifications of rights entail some uncertainty as to the future legal 
regime for fracking, the level of uncertainty in Colorado seems greatest. 
Relatedly, perhaps, Colorado is the only state in which the specification took the 
form of innovative governance, in the form of MOUs. 
According to Demestz’s thesis, the specifications in each state should 
operate so as to encourage the internalization of fracking’s neighborhood quality 
costs. And, indeed, one could characterize the legal developments in 
Pennsylvania and (to some extent) Colorado as fostering the internalization of 
such costs by fracking entities. But the 2014 law in Texas seems to be designed 
to do quite the opposite by allowing cost externalization to neighbors. To state 
the point in the terms of Demsetz, what we observe in Texas is akin to ranchers 
in an area, faced with the risk of overgrazing, repealing whatever minimal 
restrictions they had in place on grazing and explicitly adopting a graze-as-
much-as-you-can approach.  
With respect to water quality and quantity, all of the states changed their 
laws addressing water quality to some extent, with Texas modifying its well 
casing laws, Colorado adding buffer requirements around public drinking water 
supplies and water quality testing mandates, and Pennsylvania more thoroughly 
revising its regulatory regime.284 But particularly for issues such as water 
quantity in Texas—where water rights disputes were prevalent even before the 
rise of another water-using industry—the lack of substantial response seems 
surprising. And for water quality, particularly for highly sensitive issues such as 
protecting the quality of drinking water, one might have expected even more of 
a response in Colorado and Texas.  
B. LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY POLITICS 
Much of the Pennsylvania neighborhood quality story, although generally 
supportive of the Demsetz theory, highlights the extent to which raw political 
contingencies can drive outcomes to either result in, or not result in, greater 
internalization of costs that accompany intensified resource use. A Republican 
governor was in office when the 2012 oil and gas law was enacted, but a 
Democrat preceded and followed that governor in office. This law expressly 
required local governments to allow oil and gas development in all zoning 
 
 284. Supra Part II. 
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districts—an unabashed attempt to encourage the industry to operate in 
Pennsylvania.285 Although it included a suite of state-level environmental 
restrictions, including increased setbacks between wells and environmental 
resources, many deemed these to be inadequate to address the externalities of 
fracking. If a Democrat had been in office in 2012, he or she might well have 
vetoed a bill seemingly as one-sided as the 2012 law.  
In Colorado, politics have also mattered, and specifically political 
uncertainty. Colorado courts have limited the role of localities in regulating 
fracking, but they certainly have not held that the Colorado Constitution would 
bar either a new state law further curtailing or broadly increasing the regulatory 
power of localities vis-à-vis fracking. Indeed in 2019, Senate Bill 181 could be 
reasonably described as substantially expanding local control over oil and gas 
development.286 And Colorado state politics, with its mix of powerful extractive-
industries and also a large environmentalist constituency, could conceivably 
(and did, in 2019) turn sharply in favor of local control over oil and gas 
operations. It was not the free market that generated the governance innovation 
of MOUs between local governments and industry, but, it seems, instead the fact 
that the wide range of conceivable political outcomes at the state level 
incentivized contractual compromise solutions to the problem of neighborhood 
quality externalities.  
Politics, too, likely explains much of the deviation from the Demsetz story 
in Texas, with respect to neighborhood quality, water quantity, and water 
quality. In Texas state politics, the oil and gas industry has a very long and 
(substantially) bipartisan tradition of dominance, in part because of history and 
culture, and in part because of the industry’s centrality to the state economy.287 
Among other things, the industry is a powerhouse source of political campaign 
contributions. In Colorado and Pennsylvania, the industry also has substantial 
power, but that support is more limited to the Republican party than in Texas, 
and the Republican party in those states is far less dominant than it is in Texas. 
The sheer power of the oil and gas industry at the local government level 
in Texas also helps explain the low or non-response to the risk of groundwater 
depletion. The decentralized Texas groundwater conservation district system in 
effect means that, in those Texas counties where the oil and gas industry is 
politically strong and the regulation-averse Republican party dominates, a 
groundwater district will be inclined to be quite solicitous to the desires of the 
oil and gas industry. That includes almost all Texas counties, including those in 
the parched Permian Basin, where fracking is most obviously risking localized 
groundwater depletion.288  
 
 285. See supra text accompanying note 92.  
 286. See supra notes 116–118 and accompanying text.  
 287. Davis, supra note 109, at 182. 
 288. See Ross Ramey, Analysis: The Blue Dots in Texas’ Red Political Sea, TEX. TRIB. (Nov. 11, 2016, 
12:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2016/11/11/analysis-blue-dots-texas-red-political-sea/ (illustrating 
Republican domination of Texas). 
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That power also has been evident at the state level in Texas. As noted in 
Part II, bills that would clearly classify water wells for fracking as not exempt 
from groundwater district permitting have not gone anywhere in Texas’ 
Republican-dominated legislature and, if they did, a Republican governor might 
well veto them. The political power of the oil and gas industry also can be seen 
in the sidelining of the Texas Department of Environmental Quality regarding 
fracking and the vesting of complete regulatory jurisdiction in the industry-
friendly Railroad Commission, which has been hesitant to require water 
recycling by fracking operators on the scale required to mitigate the demands 
fracking places on groundwater supply.289 
C. JUDICIAL POLITICS AND LEGAL CULTURE  
Just as legislative and regulatory politics and the influence of the oil and 
gas industry in the legislative process explains much of the deviation from the 
Demsetz story, so, too, might the politics of courts and legal tradition. In 
Pennsylvania, when the state enacted a law essentially requiring local 
governments to welcome fracking, the fact that the state supreme court struck 
down this law under a rarely used and extremely vague constitutional 
amendment might have been one of happenstance. If the political process for 
appointing and retaining justices on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court happened 
to have produced a court with a majority that was strongly oriented toward 
protecting industry, the 2014 Robinson decision might have been four-two in 
favor of upholding the 2012 statute rather than four-two in favor of striking it as 
unconstitutional. 
Unlike Pennsylvania, Texas has no environmental rights amendment in its 
constitution, and, even if it did, it is difficult to imagine the Texas Supreme Court 
invalidating an express preemption statute that was designed to foster the 
continued prosperity of the oil and gas industry in the state. Texas is one of eight 
states in which Supreme Court judges are elected in explicitly partisan elections, 
although a justice can be appointed by the Governor when there is a vacancy and 
serve until the next election.290 All of the recent and current justices on the Texas 
Supreme Court are Republicans.291 Given their party affiliation and connection 
to partisan politics, it would be surprising to see the Texas Supreme Court adopt 
a position sharply at odds with the Republican establishment in the state. 
Moreover, the legal culture of Texas courts makes it unsurprising that the 
Texas Supreme Court has refused and, we predict, will continue to refuse to 
jettison the rule of capture in the context of water quantity—a rule highly 
solicitous to water users, regardless of how much they use. After all, it was the 
 
 289. For a review and critique of the Railway Commission’s approach to water recycling, see Lauren Jaynes, 
The Effectiveness of Water Recycling Efforts by the Texas Railroad Commission, 67 BAYLOR L. REV. 300 (2015). 
 290. Emma Platoff, In Campaigns for Texas’ Top Courts, Judicial Candidates Must Rely on Party ID, TEX. 
TRIB. (Oct. 29, 2018, 12:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2018/10/29/texas-supreme-court-election-2018-
court-of-criminal-appeals/. 
 291. Id. 
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Texas Supreme Court that established the capture rule for groundwater in 1905 
in the first place, and that subsequently declined to discard it a number of 
subsequent cases that could have been a vehicle for doing so.292 A little over a 
decade after Sipriano,293 the Texas Supreme Court in effect expanded its 
embrace of capture by holding that landowners have a property right in water 
they intend to capture but have been purportedly restricted from doing so by 
government regulation.294 And in 2015, the court let stand a November 2013 
lower court decision affirming that permit decisions restricting the amount of 
groundwater farmers could withdraw amounted to a regulatory taking of two 
orchards.295 Thus, if the Texas Supreme Court were to overrule or even introduce 
real exceptions to the common law rule of capture, it would need to disavow a 
long line of cases, including quite recent ones. 
D. PATH DEPENDENCE  
The responses of all three states to various externalities also highlight the 
importance of the legal institutions in place before the technological or other 
change that intensifies resource use. These institutions are sticky; from a 
resource-based and political perspective, modifying laws and legal systems is 
incredibly difficult, and thus institutions persist even as politics and preferences 
change. Within the Demsetz story, this means that although the increased 
externalities associated with greater resource use might make the transaction 
costs of property rights definition more worthwhile, these transaction costs 
might still be prohibitively high in the case of long-entrenched institutions. This 
path dependence appears to strongly affect whether there is a move toward the 
internalization of the increased externalities from intensified resource use. In 
some cases, path dependence allows for easier internalization of harms, with pre-
existing, relatively stringent laws or precedent providing, in a way, an easy 
excuse to ratchet up regulation despite political opposition from an organized 
industry. In other cases, it fosters reliance on a tradition of relatively lax laws 
that prove too difficult to change despite large externalities—even those that 
generate a great deal of public concern.  
In the case of neighborhood quality, the fact that the Pennsylvania 
Constitution contained the Environmental Rights Amendment—an amendment 
that, when adopted, had nothing to do with fracking technology that would 
develop decades later and that does not seem to have been even oriented to 
conventional oil and gas extraction—provided a basis for a plurality of justices 
to strike down an industry-friendly law.296  
 
 292. See Bray, supra note 240, at 1298–1305 (discussing the Texas Supreme Court’s 1904 decision in 
Houston & Texas Central Railroad Co. v. East and its subsequent re-affirmance of the doctrine in 1955, 1978, 
and 1999 despite the doctrine’s modification or abandonment in others States).  
 293. See Siprano v. Great Spring Waters of America, 1 S.W.3d 75 (Tex. 1999). 
 294. Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 838–45 (Tex. 2012). 
 295. Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Bragg, 421 S.W.3d 118, 145 (Tex. App. 2013). 
 296. See supra Subpart II.B. 
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Path dependence also helps explains the lack of dynamism in Texas 
regarding rights in groundwater: because Texas, pre-fracking, began with legal 
doctrine (capture) and water regulatory institutions (local groundwater districts) 
that are not well suited to address water supply depletion risks, a total shift in 
doctrine and institutions would be required for there to be comprehensive 
adaptation to the depletion risk posed by fracking. In prior appropriation states 
with a strong state water agency or other state institutions, new demands for 
freshwater could be resolved within the context of the existing law and 
institutional structure, as occurred in Colorado.297 But in Texas, new doctrine 
and institutions arguably would be needed, and that requires a greater political 
and cultural force and greater transition costs than would modification within a 
current framework. It was not pre-ordained that Texas would have a 
groundwater legal regime that is particularly poorly-suited to addressing new 
demands on supply; other Western, politically conservative, extraction-industry-
friendly states like Wyoming apply prior appropriation to groundwater and have 
state and sub-state permitting authorities.298 But Texas has adhered to a water 
regime that makes it poorly-suited to address depletion risks, including those 
from fracking. 
The water quantity and quality responses in Pennsylvania and Colorado are 
also largely stories of path dependence. The fact that the Susquehanna River 
Basin Commission—a sophisticated, somewhat ecologically-oriented 
institution—was in place before the rise of fracking allowed for the rapid 
application of passby flow requirements to prevent water depletion in Eastern 
Pennsylvania. And the Commission’s passby requirements spurred state 
regulators to apply similar rules in western Pennsylvania.299 
Colorado’s path dependence in the water quantity context was slightly 
different. Colorado appears to not have changed its laws despite increasing 
demands on fracking from water because those laws were already strict.300 There 
was not much to be realistically changed when it came to proposed water 
withdrawals from water sources that were already overdrawn and highly 
regulated. This forced operator innovation in the form of water reuse. Industry 
simply had to find a way to frack despite the fact that, in some regions, no water 
rights were available.301 
Considered together, these political, legal, and institutional factors show 
that the Demsetz theory is often complicated by forces that dampen or strengthen 
the push to more clearly define property rights for an activity with increasingly 
large externalities.  
 
 297. See supra Subpart II.B. 
 298. See Underground Water Act, 1947 Wyo. Sess. Laws 112–15 (providing that groundwater rights are 
subject to priority of appropriation, with an exception for household).  
 299. See supra Subpart II.A. 
 300. See supra Subpart II.B. 
 301. See generally OSTROM, supra note 7.  
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CONCLUSION  
This Article builds upon the many legal accounts of Demsetz by exploring 
whether the Demsetz thesis can fully explain the legal responses (or lack thereof) 
to intensified resource use. The Demsetz thesis can only account for some of 
what we observe in the booming fracking industry. In all three case study states 
explored here—states with diverse geographies, climatic conditions, and 
political climates—some specification of property rights did emerge. But 
legislative and judicial politics as well as path dependence are needed to account 
for the differences among Pennsylvania, Colorado, and Texas. The Texas 
experience, in particular, shows that intensified resource use and greater 
externalities may even produce new legal entitlements for an industry to 
continue to externalize the costs of resource use. This understanding sheds light 
on the debate over whether federal regulation of fracking may be justified as a 
supplement to state regulation,302 and also underscores the need for further 
empirical study of how economic and technological innovation does—and 
sometimes does not—impact law. 
The Demsetz theory still does much of the legwork in predicting how 
resource users and governments are likely to respond to increasing use of a 
resource and associated externalities. Even in Texas, where the state responded 
to water quantity and neighborhood quality externalities by seemingly 
enhancing the right to frack for oil and gas, legislators did meaningfully change 
regulations in the area of water quality. But legal responses that produce full 
cost-internalization of resource extraction are rare, a result that is perhaps an 
intuitive one given that resource extraction industries are entrenched in a number 
of states and an increasingly polarized political atmosphere encumbers efforts at 
legal reform. 
  
 
 302. See, e.g., Wiseman, supra note 31 (critiquing states’ uneven responses); see also Merrill & Schizer, 
supra note 24 (arguing for the continued primacy of state regulation of hydraulic fracturing). 
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